RULES OF GOVERNMENT:

Or, a true

BALANCE

BETWEEN

SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY.

WRITTEN

By a Perſon of Honour, immediately after the late CIVIL WAR. And now Publiſhed, to prevent Another.

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THE PREFACE.

THE following Papers were written by a Perſon that had been bred and liv'd long in a Court, and having ſuffer'd in the late Times, ſaw the dangerous Rocks upon which both Prince and People had ſplit, and therefore in his private Retirement made theſe Reflections, as hoping that ſuch juſt Weights and Meaſures might preſerve the Balance better for the future.

They could not have been publiſh'd at a more ſeaſonable Time than the preſent, when the Nation, both out of Duty and Inclination, are willing to ſhew all due Obe-

dience and Submiſſion to their Prince; and yet on the other hand, from the Dangers they have lately eſcap'd, are watchful for the Defence of their Laws and Liberties. It is not for the Intereſt of the Nation, that the Prince or People ſhould carry their good Intentions too far, ſo as to be extravagant in their Complaiſance, or be too reſerv'd through the Abundance of their Caution.

The Author has juſtify'd the Honour of Human Nature againſt Mr. *Hobbs*'s Notions of Power, in ſo ſhort, and yet ſo plain a Manner, that it is the Sum of thoſe Arguments that are contain'd in larger Volumes.

He recommends the Virtues that become a Prince, with ſuch maſterly Strokes, that make the Image extremely beautiful and admirable. The Prophetick Author, though not deſignedly, draws the Character of her preſent Majeſty; and it being done

ſo

ſo long ago, it is plain that he could have no Thoughts of Flattery. Former Ages may have given us the Character of an accompliſh'd Prince, but it is the Happineſs of our Age to enjoy and ſee one in Perfection.

THE

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RULES

RULES OF GOVERNMENT:

Or, a true

BALANCE

BETWEEN

Sovereignty and Liberty.

GOD, and Nature made Men ſociable Creatures, which appears by this; That every Man affects a Companion, which ariſes from this, that every ſingle Man ſtands in need of another's help. Men could not have lived together in a Body politick, if God had not diſpoſed the natural Inclinations of their Minds for ſuch a Society, and the ſame reaſon, that leads them, to cohabit together extracted from them the preferring of publick Good, before private Intereſt, or the whole before any Part. So as Government is an Ordinance of God, and not an Invention of Man, and ariſes not, as Mr. *Hobbs* would make it, from the Paſſion of Fear, which one Man had of another, but from the Moral Virtue of Juſtice, to do as one would be done unto. *Government as examin'd by Reaſon.*

This makes the politick Body, ſo much to reſemble the natural, the Brain muſt be diſtin-

guiſhed from the Head, and the Heart from the Liver. If one Part gives Life, another muſt Senſe, and a third Nutrition. The Underſtanding (or Prince, or Sovereign Power) muſt give the Law, and animal Spirits (or Nobility) muſt influence the Nerves, or Inſtruments of Motion through the whole Body, or ſubordinate Officers, to ſet on Work, the Muſcles (or organical Members, or Commonalty) to perform the ſeveral Offices, which belong to the ſeveral Faculties of the Soul of Government.

But we will not affectedly follow Metaphors, or Reſemblances, which only ſerve for Illuſtration, but not for Proof.

The Object of Government, ſtands in Perſons Ruling, who are either Supreme, whether the Supremacy lies in one or more Perſons. Here Rule, or Government is uncontroulable, yet with an Eye and Duty to publick Weal or *Salus Populi*, and an Accountableneſs to God; or elſe they are ſubordinate Magiſtrates under him, or them, in whom the Supremacy is lodg'd. Theſe rule by the Sovereign's Commiſſion; the Powers whereof they are not to exceed, and they are accountable for the Execution thereof, not to God only, but to Man likewiſe.

The Perſons Ruled, are the People in general, that is the Nobility, either Eccleſiaſtical or Civil, and the Commons.

Theſe three Eſtates of Men, which among us make up a Parliament, are united to the King or Supreme as Members with their Head, they repreſent the whole Body of the People unto the King, but the King is the true Repreſentative of the People to all the World.

The Sovereign is the virtual Body of the Nation, the three Eſtates are the Repreſentative Body, and the People themſelves are the Eſſential One.

As the Object of Government ſtands in Things, they are either Prerogatives, which are in Defence of the Government it ſelf, and of the Sovereign Perſon and to be made uſe of in both Caſes, or elſe Laws civil or municipal for ſecuring the Lives, Liberties, Properties, *&c.* of the Subject. Thus, *ad Cæſarem Poteſtas omnium pertinet, ad ſingulos Proprietas.* Power belongs to a Prince and Property to the Subject. Or elſe it ſtands in Matters, Divine, Civil or Military, that is, Religion, Juſtice, Counſel, Commerce, Confederation, Treaſure, Arms by Sea and Land: For theſe ſeven are the great Sinews, Nerves or Pillars of Government.

Government and Governors.

Government and Governors are both God's Ordinances, for though he himſelf was the ſole Legiſlator in all thoſe Matters which concern'd Man's ultimate Happineſs, yet he left Men by the Light of their own natural Reaſon to make ſuch Laws as concern'd their Civil Intereſt, or their Concerns of this Life, as natural Reaſon dictated unto them; and becauſe no Society could be formed, and kept together, but by equal and juſt Laws, nor thoſe executed, but by ſome Perſons, therefore both Laws and Governours were made ſacred, the one to be obſerved and the other to be reverenced: therefore God owns both, and puts an Impreſſion of part of his own Honour, both on humane Laws, and Sovereign Perſons, though both theſe may be infirm and failing; for Princes, or Sovereigns may err as well in making Laws, or in their Judgments about them, as in the Execution of them, or in their own Manners. And therefore God obliged Princes to be well adviſed about making Laws, and as nigh as they could, to follow ſound Reaſon, and the beſt Precedents, and to do all with Deliberation, and good Advice, and with an Eye to publick Utility.

Nevertheleſs becauſe theſe Concerns were but about matters of an indifferent nature, and they coming under ſo many divers Circumſtances, it often puzled a wiſe, and a ſincere Governour what to ordain; and the Narrowneſs of Men's Underſtanding, whilſt the Buſineſs was in Councel or Agitation, often making that appear beſt, which as ſoon as perfected was often diſcerned not to be ſo; and this Wiſdom, and Sincerity (though not in probability ſo groſly, and ſo often) might fail in Councel, as well as Folly, and Negligence, therefore he ſtampt his own Authority, both upon humane Laws, and Governors, thereby to keep them back from being affronted; and upon this Ground it was, that Laws were by the ſame Authority that made them to be revoked, or repealed. Thus the humane Authority, from whence theſe Laws flowed, ſilenced all private Judgment and became indiſputable, there being nothing to be put in the Ballance with it: It being only the Prerogative of God's Laws, to be entertained for their Excellency; Mens for the Authority, or Station they were in: Otherwiſe all Government had been precarious, or ſubjected ſo to change, as to be unſteady, or endleſs, and ſo uſeleſs. This every Maſter of a Family ſhall find, if he give way to his Wife, Children, and Servants, to diſpute his Commands, much more than a Lord or Sovereign over a whole Nation. And this ſhould make every Maſter of a Family as careful to keep the Honour of his Prince in his great Family, as he would his own in his little Family.

The Reverence unto Authority.

Sovereignty therefore was by Divine Ordinance made unqueſtionable elſe it could never have anſwered the true ends of Government. Divine Wiſdom therefore neceſſarily armed (even in behalf

half of the governed) the Supreme Governors with theſe Powers following.

The Powers of Sovereignty, or the Prerogatives of it.

A Power, though not to preſcribe a Religion, for God, had done that, yet to protect it, and to look to the good Adminiſtration of it, ſo that natural Piety might be cheriſh'd, and God's Word, or Revelations be by publick Authority maintain'd, And thus far every State or Government, both Gentile, and Jew as well as Chriſtian hath intereſted themſelves in matters of Religion.

A Power to maintain all Sovereign Prerogatives, which were neceſſarily lodged in the Sovereign for the Maintainance of his own Authority.

A Power to make ſuch Laws, as related to the civil Concerns, Good, and Safety of that People; for in vain had been the firſt two, if there had been no Proviſion made for the laſt; for if Innovators and Conſpirators might act ſecurely, and Government be undermined and Governors expoſed, private Mens Peace would be ſoon overthrown, and new Laws, and new Governors frequently obtruded on them; therefore every one was bound with Life and Fortune to defend the Prerogatives of the Government he lived under, as much as the Municipal Laws, by which he was maintained in his Life, Liberty and Property.

A Power of Equity was neceſſarily intruſted with Sovereigns, becauſe there would be oft Occaſion, to abate the Severity of Laws; for if Extremities in Contracts, and penalty in Laws ſhould be always taken, Laws would often be Snares, and often be too burthenſome, to be born.

A Power to pardon the Breach of Laws, ſince Mercy adorns the Throne, as well as Juſtice, and no Hand is to hold forth this Scepter, but his, who holds the Sword, that ſo the Sovereign might be as well loved, as feared.

A Power

A Power to execute the Penalties of all Laws, that thus Authority might be feared for its Power, as it was to be beloved for its Clemency; and the Forfeiture or Advantage, that accrued by the Penalty (if pecuniary) was anſwerable to the Exchequer, ſince the Offence was againſt the Government.

A Power to ſtamp Moneys, or to appoint ſome one thing, which ſhould be the Standard unto all Commodities, or which ſhould equal the Value of them; which is a great Evidence of Sovereignty, ſince here is a Power, that in a Prince's own Dominions (and upon ſuch Conjunctures of times, as may be, when ſuch a Power even for want of Treaſure, and for common Safety may require it) he can appoint this Standard, to be of an inferiour Value to the thing it's changed for; the Authority of the Prince, making that valuable among Buyers and Sellers at home, though not abroad, which anſwers not to the intrinſick Value of the thing bought.

A Power to call together Aſſemblies, and Synods, and to diſſolve them, ſo as no Men in Numbers (becauſe Danger may ariſe to the Peace thereby) have in any well ordered State, Liberty to meet together, but as warranted thereunto by Authority, leſt Multitudes ſhould tumultuate, or innovate and bring Petitions on their Spears Head, or make private Judgment ſtand in competition with publick Authority.

A Power to create all Nobility, the Prince being the Fountain of all Honour; as likewiſe to make all Miniſters of State at home, as great Officers, Judges, Councellors and all ſubordinate Magiſtrates; for Supreme Power muſt be the Root of all other Powers, and of all Titles, and it muſt be one in it ſelf; for Power, that is to preſerve Peace, is capable of no Rivalſhip, or Co-ordination; for that would diſtract Obedience at home

home and abroad. No foreign Nation can entertain Treaties with any other, whoſe Sovereignty or Singleneſs of Power appears with Uncertainty, where it is lodged: So as Co-ordination is inconſiſtent with all kinds of Government; for two of equal Powers, ſince they may be of divers Minds, muſt diſtract, not ſettle, or make peaceable any Government.

A Power of ſending Ambaſſadors to foreign Princes; the Ambaſſador's Office being to repreſent the Prince, as the Prince doth his whole Nation, and by this Means commerce about Trade, Leagues offenſive and defenſive are made with other Nations.

A Power of making War and Peace; for it's fit none judge of the proper Reaſons and Seaſons for theſe great Engagements but that Perſon (or other Perſons) in whom the Supremacy, and Sovereignty is lodged; Princes are prudent, when they obſerve the Bent and Inclination of their People in Affairs even of this great Conſequence; but Subjects invade the Prince's Right, when they intermingle herein more than humbly ſhewing their Sentiment of it.

Theſe are neceſſary Qualifications of all kind of Sovereignty, and theſe are called Prerogatives, or Regal Powers, for no Kingdom, Common-wealth or State can want theſe; and theſe Powers muſt be lodged in one or ſome great Perſons, and ſo the Government and Governors ſtand both by the Ordinance of God as by his Divine Inſtitution.

Now to acknowledge the Supreme Governors, and yet to undermine them in theſe Rights, is a ſubtil Part of Diſloyalty; for give them a great Title, and no other to determine the moſt important concerns, or not to diſpenſe Rewards and Puniſhments, and they will ſoon be reputed but as Idols, and be firſt deſpiſed, and then dethroned.

How

How they might be herein limited unto the end he or they may the more deliberately execute theſe Powers, ſhall be ſhewed hereafter.

Theſe Powers, the Prince, or State (nay the People, if they underſtood their own Concern) are as much bound to defend, as they are the Municipal Laws of the Land made in behalf of themſelves; for Prerogatives are to be kept as ſacred as Laws; one is, to defend the Government, the other the Subjects under the Government: One ought as truly to be made uſe of for the ſafety, and Utility of the whole Body of, the People, as the other for particular Men; for true publick Safety, was the Mother of all this Prerogative; and *Salus Populi Suprema Lex*, The Safety of the People is the Supreme Law.

Sovereign Perſons.

Thus we ſee theſe Powers, to the end they may be executed, muſt be lodged in Perſons; and no Government can want theſe Powers, or Perſons, ſo as whoever invades either of them, everthrows all Government, or diſenables it to provide for the Safety of the People or Body politick.

If theſe Powers be lodged in one Perſon, then the Form of Government is called a *Monarchy*; if in a few chief, or choice Men, *Ariſtocracy*; if in all the People it is a *Democracy*. Deviation from theſe are termed, *Tyranny*, *Oligarchy*, *Ochlocracy*.

For my own part, I cannot believe that there can be any ſuch kind of Govetnment, as pure *Democracy*; for if the Supreme Power be lodged in the whole People, then they are both Governors and Governed, and many Abſurdities will follow, as will be ſhewed hereafter.

Paternal Power.

Hence it is, that God made paternal Power the Foundation of all civil Government: And from hence moſt reaſoning Men agree, that Monarchical Government is beſt ſuiting with God's Ordinance and the Benefit of Society; for even *Ariſtotle* himſelf

himſelf, bred in and amongſt Republicks, allows Monarchy as the fitteſt Organ for the Soul of Government to work by, as through its Unity leſs ſubject to Diviſions, and as fitteſt for Secrecy and Expedition, and being hereditary, and not elective, it is agreed freeſt from Factions, or laying wait for Changes, or bribing for Voices, which are unavoidable and dangerous in all popular Elections; ſo as it may be ſaid, by all theſe natural Advantages God *inſtituted* Monarchy, and permits only other Forms. But be the Form what it will, the laſt Appeal muſt be Sovereign, and muſt have Power to exerciſe all the beforementioned Marks of Sovereignty, or elſe the Government muſt be imperfect.

Monarchy the beſt Form of Government.

When paternal Government ceaſt, that is to ſay, when the *Communis Stirps*, or firſt Parent was grown through collateral Lines, not to be readily known, or to be come at, and that Genealogies, and Relations were not exactly kept, and that mixt Families were numerouſly join'd together, and when large Colonies were ſent, to plant void Countries, then choice was made of ſome eminent Man, to be a Leader, or Duke, or Guide, or Prince, or whatever they would call him (or of ſome Optimates, or chief Men, or Sanhedrim, or what Form beſt pleaſed) to go in and out before the People, or to exerciſe the Sovereign Power. Thus the People who had no hand in the Government (for that was purely God's Ordinance) came at laſt, when paternal Government ceaſt to have a Power of Conſent in diſpoſing and lodging Government in one or more Perſons. Hence it is that Government is called, by one Apoſtle, the Ordinance of God, and by another, the Ordinance of Man; for Power is originally from God in the Abſtract, and Subſtance of it, though in the Concrete or Specification, or in reſpect of Circumſtances

How paternal Government ceaſt, and the People to have a hand in the Election.

cumſtances thereunto belonging (as whether the Title be King or Commonwealth, the Juriſdiction limited, or abſolute) from Men; which in effect is the true Expoſition, or Reconciliation of the two great Apoſtles.

However, though he, that aſſumed this Power without conſent, was an Uſurper, yet when the Power was once lodged, or diſpoſed by conſent, or Submiſſion, it could not be reaſſumed; for though the People ſubmitted their own Necks, yet they gave not the Government; for the Government by an indiſcernable Providence, when the Form is agreed on, is to be aſſigned to God; and it appears to belong to him, ſince the eſſential part of it, *viz.* the Power of Life and Death belongs ſingly to him; for no Man hath Power over his own Life, and therefore he cannot give it to another. His Wiſdom therefore thought not fit, to truſt the Giddineſs of the People in general, with a Matter of ſuch Concern even unto their own Peace, and Welfare; for often Changes, which they would have affected, would have been more pernicious to the Good of Society, than moderate, nay immoderate Preſſures. Hence it was even in order to publick Weal, that Sovereign Authority was ſet above all private Judgment, to avoid Diſputes, as well as his, or their Perſons, that executed it.

Why Princes were not queſtionable.

The Sovereign Power by Conſent once lodged in one, or many for the ſame Reaſon, is not reaſſumable; for we ſee originally that Power was not, nor could ever be lodged in the diffuſive Body of the People, who had not a Power over their own Lives, and ſo could leſs have over others; for Government was no humane Invention, but God's Ordinance. When People firſt elected their Governors, we may ſay it anſwered unto God's Providence, when by Rebellion, or Deſection they

they changed him, it was his Permiſſion; for when a People demerits of him, he withſtands not their intangling themſelves and ſcratching themſelves with their own Briars: So as when the Form of Government is once ſettled, the Poſterity, or Succeſſors of that People are bound by the Conſent, and choice of their Foreſathers becauſe they are reputed; to live in their Predeceſſors, and they are ſaid to be alive in them. And thus when Providence, in the Place of natural Governors or Parents, introduced civil, the whole diffuſive Body of the governed were to be (in this Reſpect of Change of their Form of Government) reputed in the State of Wives, or of Children, or Minors; for though the one might have choſen, whether ſhe would have diſpoſed her ſelf to ſuch a Man, to be her Husband: yet having done it, ſhe was always under his Subjection, ſo the Heir is during his Minority to his Guardian; yet both Husband and Guardian ought to do all right to their Charge; and Courts there are, to relieve both, as God's Throne or Court is to relieve Subjects: Children and Wives may be thus relieved, but they are not to reſiſt.

A People under Government are in the State of Wives or Wards.

Hence likewiſe it is, that Princes are not to be reſiſted by Subjects, and both philoſophical Light and politick ſerve to diſcern this as well as Divine Light. For ſays moral *Epictetus*, *We are not tied to Parents, and Governors as they are good, but as they are Parents and Governors.* And deep ſighted *Tacitus* ſays, *Good Princes are to be wiſht and prayed for, bad (or whatever they proved) are to be endured*; and he gives the Reaſon for it, for ill Princes are to be endured as we do Storms and Tempeſts, which are ſhowred down upon us from above, or from the Providence which hath an Hand in giving them, and an Eye to obſerve, how we entertain them. Thus

God required Non-Reſiſtance in order to the Subjects own Good; for Anarchy was worſe than Tyranny; and yet at the ſame time if the Prince's Command was immoral, he enjoyed Non Obedience, before the temporal or immoral Command, which flowed from Man's Unreaſonableneſs.

Whoſe Truſtees Sovereigns are.

Hence likewiſe it appears, that Men are not to think, becauſe Princes or States are truſted for them, or appointed for their good, therefore they are conditional Truſtees to them, for thoſe in whom the Sovereign Power is lodged, are God's Truſtees, and therefore to God only are they to anſwer for their Truſt,

Nor is a Prince leſs than his People; becauſe he was truſted either by, or for them, and even by God's Appointment is to Miniſter to them for their Good; for the ſame Reaſon would make Angels leſſer than Men, becauſe Angels are God's Miniſters for the good of Men.

However primarily the Prince or State are truſted for the good of Subjects; for they are ſet over Men, as the Sun is over the World, to enlighten and influence it, and they ſhall be accountable for it. But ſecondarily, They are intruſted to maintain the Dignity and Rights of their own regal Power, and not to let every Humour of the People diſable them to govern, by pulling from them the Feathers of their Prerogatives.

This Subjection, which God requires, is no unreaſonable thing; for we percieve it but a Suffering in Matters of Mens external Concerns. For, as hath been ſaid, Governours Authorities extend but to Matters of an indifferent Nature. It is often Pride and Impatience which produce Complaints, as may appear by this, That moſt commonly when the times are moſt plentiful, and the Grievances very tolerable, then delicacy of Senſe

Senſe renders Men moſt querulous, and their Sufferings are begot more from their Inferences and Reaſonings what may follow, than what they feel; ſo as they muſt be beholden to their Ingenuity, before they can juſtifie their Complaints. Reflect on the Reign of *Charles* the Firſt, as I have impartially made ſome Memoirs upon it, and this will be found true.

Thus much for the Singleneſs of Government, and the Non Reſiſtance of the Governed.

But it is objected, Is it not more reaſonable to have a co-ordinate Power joined with that of the Prince? No ſure; for no Government can admit a diſtinct equal Power within itſelf; for this is but like the Doctrine of Polytheiſme: For making many Gods and many Sovereigns is equally abſurd; Co ordination is like to prove the Mother of a Civil War. However, Limitation of Sovereignty is agreed on by all Politicians, and Civilians, to be conſiſtent even with Sovereignty itſelf. For hereby Sovereignty is not taken from the Perſon, or Perſons governing, though to him or them the Abſoluteneſs of the Execution, for ſome time, or in ſome part of the Sovereign Power (as not to make Laws without the three Eſtates or Orders of Subjects, *viz.* Nobility, Clergy, and Commons Conſent) be ſuſpended; for hereby the Power is not transferred unto any other; ſo he or they remain abſolute, though limited. For thus, as he or they cannot do it without another, ſo no other body can do it without him or them; and when it is done it is done ſingly by the Prince, if it be in a Monarchy; or by the State, if it be in an Ariſtocracy. For a limited (which we call a mixt) Monarchy, or a mixt Commonweal is in ſuch Caſes but like a Man that is bound, or a Man that is ſleeping, he hath temporally loſt his Motion, but not his Strength

Limitation of Sovereignty expounded.

Strength; for as ſoon as he hath the Concurrence of thoſe whoſe Conſent he ſtipulated to take, then he is unbound or awakened; and then he or they (not the Concurrers) are ſaid to act ſolely and ſovereignly; for the Power is virtually in his or their Perſons that repreſent the Sovereignty. For it is the Monarch's or State's affirmative Voice that makes the Law or Sanction, and it is his, or their negative Voice that rejects it. Thus the Sovereign Perſon, or Perſons, is the ſingle Soul of the Law, and all this to avoid the ill Conſequences of Co ordination. And hence it is, that the true Repreſentative of any People is the Prince, in a Monarchy, or the States in a Commonweal; and from him or them there is no Appeal, but unto God, and wherever the laſt Appeal is, there is the Sovereignty. And therefore the People abate of their own Greatneſs, when they think any repreſent them but their Prince or State; others may repreſent them in order, to repreſent their Condition good or bad to the Prince, as a Looking-Glaſs doth repreſent the Body to the Head's view; but as bearing their Image both at home and abroad, the Prince only repreſents the State of the People. An unequal League with a Foreigner takes not off ſupreme Power. The ſame may be ſaid of paying Tribute, becauſe that may be for redeeming any Injury, or for ſome acknowledgment of a Deliverance; but that payed, it is all that can be demanded. Neither is Feudal Obligation any Deprivation of Sovereignty, ſince that is but a perſonal Obligation or Service, but gives no risk to his Government who is bound to this Obſervance. Thus careful Civilians and Politicians are to keep Sovereignty ſacred, though by ſuch ties as theſe it may ſeem or appear reſtrained.

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But leaſt ſome ſhould complain of Providence for giving theſe great Powers unto Princes and States, who are but frail Men: On God's Behalf we will ſumm up the Reaſons for it uſually given. 1*ſt*, God requires the Prince to rule for the good of his Subjects. 2*dly*, If they do not, he denounces himſelf a Revenger. 3*dly*, He requires Obedience and Non-Reſiſtance to prevent Civil Diſſentions, which are uſually worſe than Tyranny; for Tyrants generally extend not their Oppreſſions upon a whole Nation, but ſome particular Perſons they are diſpleas'd with, whilſt Civil War, or popular Commotions, ſpread over the whole Land, and amongſt nigh Relations; and if Subjects may reſiſt for any one Reaſon which they will alledge, it is very probable they will never want a Reaſon. 4*thly*, God often experiments, whether Subjects will depend upon his Promiſes, to reſtrain the fierceneſs of Princes, or on their own impatient Humours and Violences, or whether by an humble Patience they will wait his time for Redreſs, ſince what Men can't reſiſt at one time, they find they may divert at another. 5*thly*, He ſubjects People to theſe Preſſures, becauſe they deſerve ſuch a Scourge, as an ill Prince, for being themſelves ſo diſobedient to himſelf. Or 6*thly*, Becauſe very often they force a good-natur'd Prince to be an ill one, as *Boccalini* ſays, *The Sheep getting the Dogs Teeth into their own Mouths to the Danger of the Sheperd.* Or becauſe like *Neapolitan* Horſes, if they be well dreſt and fed, they will endure no Rider. *Laſtly*, Becauſe a Prince's Tyranny can but reach unto the outward Man, and to the outward things of a Man, which God's wiſe Providence in this World often expoſes, to wean Men from it, and to draw them to expect their ultimate Happineſs or Reſt in another World.

Why God leaves a whole People to one, or a few Mens Rule, who may abuſe it.

Why God often permits Subjects to be rebellious

Thus, though a bad as well as a good Prince be thus ſecured by God, God hath not aſſured him but he will puniſh him, even by permitting an ill Spirit to riſe betwixt him and his People, and ſo it's God's Sentence on the Prince, (to whoſe Tribunal he ſtands bound) though a Judgment or Puniſhment on them both. The Prince is juſtly puniſh'd by God, for violating the natural Right of his Subjects, and for breach of his Obligation or Oath unto them, that he would govern them by their Laws, and be careful of them both in their Lives and Liberties. For Natural, Civil, and Divine Right teaches the Head to conſult for the good of the Body, and the Body readily to bolſter the Head, ſince the Diſeaſes of the Head are dangerous to the ſafety of the Body.

Thus far we may ſay, this Queſtion about Government, and the Nature and End of Sovereignty, is examin'd ſingly by ſound Reaſon or Reaſoning. Next, let us again enquire after it by the Word of God, and after that particularly by our own National Laws.

Now the ſame things come to be examined by Scripture, or God's Word, as it is expounded by our own Church.

No Conſtitution of Government can be ſo happily framed, as by its ſingle Fabrick to ſecure the Peace of a Nation, elſe ſurely God's *Theocracy* amongſt the Jews, and paternal Government among the Patriarchs, and the Kings of *Judah* would have been ſo manag'd, as to have prevented all Complaints. When divine as well as prophane Hiſtory ſhall be conſulted, it will be found that Policy is like Morality, and may be much improved by theſe two Words, SUSTAIN and ABSTAIN. For the Prince muſt abſtain from Violence or Rapine, and neither for his Pleaſures, nor Ambitions, may he ſuffer himſelf to prey on his People; and often he muſt bear with

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or ſuſtain their perverſe or froward Humours, leſt unſeaſonably ſtirring them he make a Fermentation which he cannot quiet; and Subjects will find the Bleſſing of Government flows more from their Paſſive-Obedience than from any other nice Care of their Liberties. For Impatience of Subjects has overthrown more States than the Tiranny of Princes. And moſt commonly God will not ſend a People good Governours, when they will not fit themſelves to bear ill ones. It was therefore not only the Wiſdom, but the Goodneſs of God toward Subjects, that he made Sovereign Perſons only anſwerable to himſelf; all other ways are, as *Hoſea* ſays, *Setting up of Kings*; but not by him, or his Oeconomy pleaſes them not, and therefore they eat ſowre Grapes, or frame to themſelves falſe Principles, and their Teeth are ſet an Edge, or they deſtroy the Peace they hunt after. For the politick Body, like the natural, when it will endure no ayle, but have immediate recourſe to ſtrong Phyſick, will ſoon purge it ſelf out of the World. But nothing of this that is ſaid infers, that Men ſhould not defend the Rights of Free-born Subjects, but that they defend them in the proper Place, or Judicatures of the Land, and not by the Sword.

But he that gave Law to every Species of Creatures, gave one to Mankind, which Man leſs exactly obſerves, by Reaſon of the Freedom of his Will, and by Reaſon of his lapſed Nature. But from the Law of his Nature, or from the Moral Law, the beſt Judicial Law is framed; which may be found by obſerving how this Law, among God's own People the *Iſraelites*, ſuits with the Moral Law, given to or for all Mankind. But at preſent we will extend this no farther than to Perſons ruling, or Legiſlators; and obſerve what Characters God in his Word puts upon them; and how he fences them from Reſiſtance, and how he tyes all

Commonalties to them by Obedience. For throughout all Scripture Kings are ſaid not to to reign over Perſons, but Nations; therefore called King of *Iſrael*, *Judah*, *&c*, and Head of the Tribes of *Iſrael*; ſo of all States under him.

Paternal Government

Scripture ſets forth how the firſt Man was born under Government, as God's Subject, how all his Poſterity were under him, and conſequently how paternal Government was the Original of all Government; and ſo all Mankind born under Government. And therefore the Precept of honouring Fathers (or Parents) being a Moral Precept, it is a Proof that Government is founded in Nature, and was by Extraction, and not Conſent. How paternal Government ceas'd, hath been already ſet forth. *Nimrod*, by Sir *Walter Rawleigh* is eſteemed a Hunter, or Uſurper, becauſe he took upon him the Government, over others, without their Conſent, or voluntary Submiſſion or Charge, not that he was an ill Prince.

And in Scripture, the Sanction or Reward that is propoſed for performing this Duty, ſhews the Benefit of Obedience; for it is, *That thy Days may be long in the Land which the Lord thy God ſhall give thee.* For Obedience of Inferiors (as hath been likewiſe obſerved) is the moſt probable way to Peace, and Peace unto a Society's Welfare. Hence it is, that Men are ſo ſtrictly charged to reverence their Governours, and Governours to look upon themſelves as Miniſters of God for good, and as Revengers to execute Wrath upon him that doth Evil. So as his Power muſt be no Terror to good Works, but employed for the Good and Praiſe, or Encouragement, of thoſe that do well.

When the Governour was not a naturul Father, to the end that he might not want natural Affection unto his People; if the People wanted one, they were not to chooſe a Stranger, but ſuch an one as *Moſes*, *Joſhuah*, *Samuel* or *David*; or whom God

God appointed, as *Saul*, ſee *Deutr.* xvii. where the Promiſe of a Prince and Virtues of a Prince are ſet forth, and ſo Kingly Rule ſhewn to be a Bleſſing, and Promiſe of God to his People from the beginning.

The Prince muſt have Humility, that his Heart be not lifted up above his Brethren. He muſt not multiply to himſelf Horſes, leſt Power incline him to be oppreſſive. He muſt not give his ſtrength to Women, for Effeminacy abates Courage and Induſtry, and ſoftens, and deſtroys him. And *Solomon* adds another Caution, *let him not drink Wine* (that is, to exceſs) *leſt he forget God's Law, or neglect Religion, and pervert judgment*; for both Women and Wine make him unfit for the Hardſhips and Difficulties of Government. Nor muſt he increaſe Riches, that is for his own private Treaſure, or by making his People miſerable, and poor, make himſelf opulent, that he may the more ſecurely tyrannize. But rich he muſt be, ſince the Ambition of his Neighbours, is at one time or another likely to diſturb his Peace; and ſince the conſtant Charge, and contingent Expences of Governours, is like to be ſo great, therefore a full Exchequer becomes a good, as well as a wiſe and politick Prince. Laſtly, though human Policy muſt be uſed in human Affairs, and that it appears too hard to expect the ſame ſtrictneſs of Morality in a King's Office which belongs to his Perſon, as a Man (which is too hard a Task for one no better vers'd in both theſe two Sciences than my ſelf, to give the limits to) Yet this may be ſaid, that the Prince is obliged, ſince Politicks flow from Ethicks, as nigh as poſſibly he can, to ſuit his Policies with good Morals, or rather, that he frame them out of (at leaſt never contrary to) the Word of God; for this will make him truly worſhip his God, and beſt teach him how to demean himſelf with Men, or how to govern him-

Scriptural Directions for a King.

ſelf, either in relation to his foreign or home Affairs. Nor can a Princes Policies warrant any thing which the Word of God forbids, but he muſt rather caſt himſelf on Providence.

Such Delineations of a Prince, as theſe are, will convince Men, that not only Government, but Governours, are the Ordination of God; for *by me*, ſays God, *Kings reign*, which *Nebuchadnezzar* acknowledges, when he ſays to *Daniel*; *your God is a God of Gods, and a Lord of Kings, and he rules in the Kingdoms of the Earth, and he gives to whomſoever he will, and ſets up over it*, (that is, whenever a People provoke him to ſend them that Curſe) *the baſeſt of men*; or as *Hoſea* may ſeem to explain it, *they caſt off his Government for Governments that men have framed*; for ſay they, *give us a King like the other Nations*; or let us caſt off King *Charles* I, for a *Cromwell*, or Chriſt for a *Barabbas*. Thus People will ſometimes ſet up a King, but not by God, and pull down a King to their own Confuſion; which God divert them from doing any more,

But that they may not thus miſchief themſelves, God's Word deſcribes a King's Power by his Character, *a King, againſt whom there is no riſing*: and what is ſaid of a King, is ſaid of all Sovereign Perſons, be they one, or more, a Monarchy, or an Ariſtocracy, a Kingdom, or a Commonweal: For if Subjects, upon Diſcontents, and Diſſatisfactions, might change the ſettled Form of Government, the Politick Body like his Natural, that is always giving Phyſick to himſelf, would be ſurely purged out of its ſettled Peace, and probably into its Grave: So as *Solomon* was very wiſe, and ſpake as well to the States of a Land, as unto particular Perſons, when he ſaid, *Be not given to change*, &c.

Fear God therefore, and honour the King, and curſe not the King (that is) ſpeak not Evil of him,

him, or in diſcourſe revile him. Remember he is thy politick Parent, go backward therefore and cover his Nakedneſs. *Shimei*'s Curſings were but Revilings. Cut not off ſo much as the lap of his Garment, or approach him not with a profane Tongue; or Hand, as if he were not the Lord's Anointed; for he cannot be innocent, that leſſens his Dignity, or clouds his Majeſty. No, do not this in thy Heart, or in thy Bed-chamber; no, nor mingle with thoſe that are given to change, for their Calamity ſhall riſe ſuddenly; or a Bird, that is, ſome ſmall or unlook'd for Accident ſhall betray thy Conſpiracy, or who knows the Ruin of them? Or it ſhall fall upon them by ſome providential Accident, and their Ruin ſhall be as ſwift as their Plots were ſecret. For if God's Word in caſe of Oppreſſion direct Men to cry unto him for Relief, and not to cry unto your Tents, *O Iſrael, what is our Reſiſtance*, but to caſt off our dependance on God's Providence, and to have recourſe unto a Witch of *Endor*, or our own Impatience? Or like an injur'd Man, that will not let the Judge give Sentence, nor the Hangman execute him that robbed him, but he will do both Offices himſelf. Rebellion therefore is like the Sin of Witchcraft, it removes its dependance on God's Providence, and flies, as hath been ſaid, unto an ill Spirit, or its own diſobedient and vindicative Humour.

There is no diſtinction betwixt a King's Perſon and his Power.

Nor muſt Men ſubtilize by diſtinguiſhing between the Power, and the Perſon; for that Apoſtle that ſays, be not afraid of the Power, expounds it by the Perſon; *for he is appointed by God*, &c. Thus a King's Perſon, and his Power cannot be ſeparate, though they may be diſtinguiſh'd, or his Authority may be where his Perſon is not, but never his Authority can be wanting where his Perſon is. Whoever therefore will not do the Law of God written in his Book, nor of the King written in his Statutes, let Judgment be executed upon

him, whether it be unto Death, or Baniſhment, or Confiſcation, or Impriſonment. And if this Command comes from *Artaxerxes* by *Ezra*, he would not have ſet it down, but as it was warrantable to execute. Nay the People of *Iſrael* themſelves ſay as much to *Joſhua*. *Whoever reſiſts thy Commandments, and will not hearken to thy word* (or Legiſlative Power) *he ſhall be put to death, for whatever thou commandeſt we will do, and whereever thou ſendeſt we will go, only the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moſes*, or be careful to rule thy ſelf by God's Law, as we will be to rule our ſelves by thine; or contradict not thou thy own will eſtabliſh'd by a Law, by ſome ſudden or paſſionate Reſolve.

God, who is the ſingle Puniſher of Princes, yet permits Subjects ſometimes to be a Scourge to their Princes.

Yet, as hath been obſerved before, though God hath reſerved Princes for his own Tribunal, yet he hath ſhewn by ſeveral Inſtances in Scripture, very particularly in that of *Abimelech, and the Men of Shechem*, that he often makes Subjects by permitting it (for it is ever evil in the Subject) to become Scourges to their Prince, and both to work each other's Ruin. As a Scourge to *David* he lets the greateſt of *Iſrael* riſe againſt him, and follow his rebellious Son *Abſalom*, and *it was of the Lord* (or his permiſſion) that nine Tribes and a half forſook *Rehoboam*, and followed *Jeroboam* for *Solomon*'s Idolatry.

However, our great Maſter born King of the World, acknowledgeth himſelf in his Humanity born a Subject to *Auguſtus*, and *Tiberius*, and doth a Miracle to pay a Tribute, and gives to *Cæſar* the things that are *Cæſar*'s, (outward Obedience and Obſervance in Matters of a ſecular and indifferent Nature) and acknowledges the Power of *Pontius Pilate* over his Life. He will not call for the Legions of Angels, he could, to defend him; nor do his Apoſtles tread in other ſteps, or teach other Doctrine. Yet doth not all this Security autho-

authorize a Prince to be arbitrary or tyrannous, for God proclaims himſelf an Avenger, nor doth his Word afford ſuch Princes any other appellation than that of a Bear, or of a Lion.

When *Nebuchadnezzar* would have his Golden Image worſhip'd, what is the Anſwer? Not, let us reſiſt, *but pardon us in this, O King! Non eſt noſtri juris peccare, pati eſt*; It is not in our power to ſin, it is to ſuffer.

Now Princes in the State of Sovereignty (as our Prince in Parliament) are ſaid to be above the Laws, becauſe they may change, abrogate, and diſpenſe with them, not becauſe when it pleaſes them, they may violate them. If they judge the Change conduces unto publick good, they are ſuperiour to the Laws; but if they remove a Law, to ſatisfie a Paſſion, or to take off a Reſtraint from themſelves, or like *Nebuchadnezzar* will be deifying themſelves, they may puniſh their Subjects for not obeying thoſe Laws, but God will puniſh them for abuſe of their Office, and other Remedy the Subjects by the Law of God have none; but by the falſe Reaſonings of a *Junius Brutus*, and of a *Buchanan* they have many. So as Subjects adventure not only their Peace, but their Salvation for their Rebellion. Rebellion is not a ſingle Sin, but a Complication of Sins, it diſquiets a whole Nation, makes great thoughts of Heart; no Man ſits under his own Vine, it involves the Innocent in the Miſery, though not in the Guilt, and tyrannizes over ſuch, over whom they have no juſt Power, or Right. The Ship Money determined by Law (though probably with all its Circumſtances not warranted ſo) was far from a Juſtification of Arms; but rather than endure a Monopoly; or a Loan, a Civil War muſt give Licenſe for plunder unto the Soldiers of both Parties, under ſo Chriſtian a King as *Charles* the Firſt was. Had his two Houſes been of the ſame Temper with him,

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or had they not had a malitious and ſhort-ſighted Policy, to alter the whole Frame of Government, how eaſily both before the War was begun, and after the Sword was blouded, might they have compoſed all things ſuitable to God's Laws, and the Laws of the Nation. But theſe Men made themſelves Slaves to their Slaves, becauſe they would not be loyal Subjects to their Prince. It is one thing for a Senate (and certainly an honeſt one, and a dutiful one) to repreſent Grievances, and to withold Supplies upon no redreſs of Grievances; but there is nothing of a Grievance properly, which violates no Law in being, but it is Rebellion to take up Arms upon ſuch Pretences.

How heinous it is to a People to affect a new Form of Government.

As *Moſes* and Chriſt taught this Subjection, ſo we ſee both their Doctrines differed not from what right Reaſon truly makes Policy; for obſerve, whether the *Grecians* caſting off the Tyranny of Monarchy, or undermining an Ariſtocracy, to ſet up a Democracy, or ſupplanting that with an Oligarchy, or caſting off all theſe for a Select 410, or an Uſurping 30. Tyrants bettered their Condition, or whether it was not more fatal to them than the Arbitrarineſs of any One, or any few ſelect Perſons.

Hence Reaſon, *Moſes* and Chriſt, muſt needs have prevailed with the Apoſtles, rather to endure the Tyranny of the worſt of Princes, under whom they lived (even *Nero*) than have quitted their ſound Doctrine; *Let every Soul be ſubject to the higher Powers.*

How loyal the Primitive Chriſtians were.

And as the Apoſtles did, ſo did their Succeſſors, the primitive Biſhops, who willingly became Martyrs rather than Rebels. He that would ſatisfie himſelf herein, let him but read *Tertullian*'s Apology, and he will find, it was not Weakneſs, or want of Courage, but ſtrength of Faith, that kept the Primitive Chriſtians quiet under the Perſecution of the moſt bloody Heathen Emperors.

But we have lived to read *Pſeudo* or falſe Teachers,

chers, that make the Doctrine of Reſiſtance a new Light, which Light is a Light that leads to Darkneſs, ſetting up the Paſſions of the Multitude, to be their own Guides, and their own Ruin.

Our great Adverſary the preſent Church of *Rome*, contrary to St. *Paul*'s Doctrine to the ſame, *Rom*, 13. makes Princes hold their Scepter, and Subjects their Allegiance of her; and the Scotch Presbytery with their Lay Interpreter *Buchanan de Jure Regni apud Scotos*, and *Junius Brutus* ſubject Princes to the People (for which there is as much warrant in Scripture for Presbyters to lord it over Princes, as for the Pope.) and ſo theſe Serpents caſting their Tails into their Mouths make Extremes meet. *The Romiſh Doctrine about Subjection.*

But judicious *Calvin*, howevet byaſs'd, was convinced by Scripture of the Unreaſonableneſs of ſuch Doctrine, therefore about the latter end of his Inſtitutions, he determines againſt Reſiſtance of Sovereign Princes, though he leaves this Gap in a ſtrong Hedge, limiting what he had laid down rather to every ſingle Man in a State, than to ſuch Orders of Men, as he called the States of a Kingdom; for unto theſe he will neither give warrant, becauſe in no Chriſtian State now are there ſuch a Conſtitution, as were thoſe of the *Demarchi*, *Ephori*, or Tribunes of the People in *Athens*, *Sparta*, and *Rome*, nor doth he make a Reſolution againſt them. Calvin.

Luther, who when the Boors, or Peaſants in *Germany* were tumultuouſly reforming themſelves, and caſting off their Prince's Authority, he diſclaims their Proceedings. I have ever, ſays he, from the beginning taught Subjection, and abhorred all Sedition, exhorted to Obedience to the higher Powers; yea even to bear with Tyranny, and wicked Government; though I perceive, ſays he, the War is managed on both ſides with an evil Conſcience, as Governours to ſettle Tyranny, and Luther. Sleidan's *Comment.*

People to gain their Desires by Sedition. Yet even this happy Instrument of Reformation made this faint Reply to some Lawyers, who press'd upon him, that the Laws of the Nation in some Cases permitted of Resistance; that he would not say, that the Gospel did impugn, or dissolve, or abolish the politick Laws of a Land. Which certainly it doth not, for the Gospel at the same time obliges the King, when it restrains the Subject from Resistance, but still it warrants no Resistance.

Whilst the Church of *England*, with *Moses*, Christ, the Apostles, and the primitive Church, countenances no Tyranny in the Prince, nor allows any Resistance in the Subject, nor recommends any stupid Insensibility to them; for she allows their orderly, and not terrifying way of petitioning. Nay in the Courts, and before the Judges appointed for it, she bids them defend themselves, she bids them not give up their Rights, but she forbids them to maintain it by force. She secures not the Prince, the Subject will not rise against him, since God being singly, and properly his Revenger may, and often doth make the Subject's Disloyalty his Rod for Tyranny, and so as both offend, he will punish both, *viz.* the one by the other. This Church, with what sound Reason (on which all sound Politicks are built) and what our own Laws assert, resolves, That all single Persons are forbid Resistance; and then farther resolves, That all Orders or States of Men in a politick Body, be the Government Monarchical, or Aristocratical, *&c.* are but as single Men in respect of the Head, or Sovereign Powers, for even these in respect of him, or them are to be reputed, even in the politick Body, but as single, or private Men, and so no more can resist the Sovereign Person, or Persons, than a private Man. This I believe to be Apostolick Doctrine, and this the Recognitions made to our own Kings in Acts of Parliament warrant us to say. Go-

Government examined by the Law of the Land.

If this be the Nature of Government in general, and of Sovereign Perſons, to whom Government is intruſted, let us in the next place examine, how the Law of this our own Nation determines the Caſe. *What the Law of England requires.*

We all know our Government is a mixt Monarchy; and yet by all Foreigners, as *Bodin*, *Grotius* and others, it is reputed an abſolute Monarchy; for Limitations which transfer not the Power unto any other, but require only the Conſent of ſome other, diveſt it not of the Title of Monarchy, or of the King's being an abſolute though not an Arbitrary Monarch. *The King of England an abſolute, though not an arbitrary Monarch.*

Our Laws ſay then,

All Perſons are under the King, and the King under none. *Axioms of Law.*

Or, *Omnis ſub Rege, & ipſe ſub nullo.*

He hath not any Peer in his Kingdom, nor any ſuperiour, but God.

Or, *Satis ei erit, quod Dominum habet ultorem.*

Then no Judge over him.

Allegiance is to be ſworn to him, and Homage, not only by every ſingle Perſon through the Kingdom, but by every ſingle Member of his two Houſes of Parliament; for not one of them can ſit there, before he hath taken the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, and he that reads either of theſe Oaths, needs not ſeek where the Sovereignty is lodged. And though theſe Oaths were formed principally, to diſclaim Papal Juriſdiction, yet that abated they are but the old Oaths of Obedience. Nay the three States of Subjects in the Kingdom, *viz.* Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, as a politick Body make the ſame Recognition. See the Recognitions made to the ancient Kings, even the *Saxous*, and thoſe to *Allegiance ſworn to him not only by ſingle Men but by the three Eſtates.*

Henry the VIIth, *Henry* the VIIIth, Queen *Elizabeth* and eſpecially to King *James*:

Great, ſay they in an Act of Parliament, "Are "ourBleſſings by uniting the two ancient Kingdoms, "or rather the two Imperial Crowns, *&c.* and up- "on the Knees of our Hearts we agnize our moſt "conſtant Faith, Obedience, and Loyalty to your "Majeſty and your Royal Progeny: And in this "high Court of Parliament, where all the Body "of the Realm, and every particular Member there- "of either in Perſon, or by Repreſentation (upon "their own Elections) are by the Laws of this "Realm deemed to be perſonally preſent.

Sir *Edward Coke* obſerves by the Laws of King *Alfred*, as well as by thoſe of the Conqueror, the ancient Kings, who were *Saxons*, had all the Lands of *England* in *Demeaſnes* (*Inſtit.* *Fol.* 58.) and the Barons, or Lords of Mannors were enfeoffed by the Conqueror with all, which the King held not, but they held it for Defence of the Realm under the King, and conſequently they were, to defend it, and ſupport it in time of Danger. The King was the Grand Lord, or Lord Paramont, and the Nobility and Gentry but the mean Lords, and all the reſt held in Vaſſallage under him or them. Freeholders came in by the Nobilities ill Husbandry, and by their ſelling Part of their Land and enfranchiſing it. But ſtill the Land was held by ſome Tenure, which obliged the Owner, Lord, or Commoner, more or leſs (as in Capite or Free Socage after the Conqueſt) for the Defence of the Land, for indeed that is the Ground Work of all Society; for every Man is naturally bound, with his Ability, to defend the Politick Body, and the Conſtitution of the Government, though the *Quotum*, and manner of the raiſing it, had the Subjects Conſent, that it might be the more equally laid, and the more cheerfully

paid

paid, and the more orderly levied, and as an Evidence that the Government was not deſpotical, but the People free, and yet thus far under Subjection.

The raiſing of Money or Taxes is one of thoſe particulars, wherein our Monarch is limited; for he cannot raiſe Money upon the Subject, but by his Commons, and with the Conſent of the Lords, or by Concurrence of them both: yet the Commons can raiſe no Money, but to give unto the King, or as the King accepts it for ſuch an Uſe, which is Conviction enough, that all the Taxes of the long Parliament were illegal and their Power an Uſurpation. *The Limitation of the King's Prerogative.*

Many other Inſtances there are of the King's ſingle Supremacy, but without mentioning more (for all are embowell'd in theſe few) we will conclude with Sir *Henry Spelman*'s Aſſertion in his *Gloſſary*, *Omnis Regni Juſtitia ſolius Regis eſt*: All the Juſtice of the Kingdom is of the King alone.

In the next Place, we will conſider him in a Parliament, and here his Prerogative is unlimited, or he is in his Zenith, or he is entirely Sovereign; for here the Purſe and the Sword are joined together. Here, with Conſent of the Lords and Commons, he makes what Laws he finds neceſſary for the Publick-Weal. The two great Caſes, wherein Monarchical Prerogative is limited, concern our Lives and Liberties which are ſecured to Subjects, by the common and Statute Laws of the Realm; for we are a free People, or we know the Law we walk by; and yet in Parliament (in matters wherein the publick Safety is concerned, or the Prince's Perſon) a new Law may declare that a Treaſon, which before the new Law was not ſo. But Complication of Acts, which were known before and acknowledged of an inferiour Species to Treaſon before the making ſuch a Law, cannot be made Treaſon, by that Law, though the Perſon for them may ſuffer as a Traitor, but *The Monarchy abſolute in Parliament.*

not by the great Act of Treaſon, which ſays, nothing ſhould be accounted Treaſon, which was not therein particularly named; yet all this Caution was, to exclude inferiour Courts from ſo denominating it, but not the King in Parliament. Indeed here Prerogative is unlimited, becauſe here whatever is determined, may juſtly be ſuppoſed well weighed, and ſo provided that it may not intrench upon Liberty in general, though for Example ſake it fall ſevere on an individual Perſon. But if a Prince be here importuned, nay violated, or his Houſes Advices be preſt upon him by Rabbles or Multitudes of *Plebeians*, this is as great a Crime in that Body towards him, as any Fact could be in the Perſon thus brought to Judgment becauſe of the Danger in its Precedent, ſince a Prince may as well force the Conſent of his two Houſes by an Army, to declare whom he pleaſes a Traytor, as they can him by Multitudes and Numbers of the meaneſt Tradeſmen, to make Laws of any kind. This was a Caſe, which God grant may never be drawn into Example; for our Judicious Hiſtorian *Daniel* ſays, "Where the Prince "and States of a Kingdom watch the Neceſſities of "each other, that they may obtain their ſeveral "ends, and make Advantages; the true Intereſt of "the Nation is loſt, and as this Proceeding is un"juſt, and not ſincere, ſo it is ever unſucceſsful, The Prætors Edict ſays, *Quod vi factum eſt, ratum non habebo:* What is done by force I will not have confirmed. And *Bartolus* ſays, *Spiritus Sanctus poſuit hæc Verba in Ore Prætoris:* The Holy Ghoſt put theſe Words into the Mouth of the Prætor.

Parliaments are called by the King's Writ, and are adjourned, prorogued, or diſſolved at the King's Pleaſure, and his Death diſſolves them, without any farther Signification, which ſhews, how entirely they depend on his Sovereignty, and on his Perſon.

No Member of it hath Privilege of Parliament

ment for Treaſon, Felony or Breach of Peace.

The two Houſes are to act ſuitably to the Call of his Writ: The Commons are called *ad faciendum*, or *conſentiendum*, or to perform or conſent: The Nobles to treat and give Councel, or *Colloquium & Tractatum habere*, and they are called, not for all, but for ſome (or ſuch of his Affairs as he pleaſes, to communicate to them) though when they meet, they have Liberty, to repreſent any Grievance, which properly is a Violation of any Law; for that cannot properly be called a Grievance, which is no Breach of a Law in being, and here likewiſe they repreſent, what they ſuppoſe, would tend to the publick Utility, ſubmitting it ſtill to the Royal Pleaſure: In a Word, the Houſes may propoſe, but it is the King that determines; for he accepts or rejects, and what he accepts is only a Law, and his Law only; for his Houſes pray a Law, but he enacts it; for Authority muſt be ſingle, and therefore our Laws call him the Beginning, Head, and End of a Parliament, which ſurely excludes all Pretence to Co-ordination.

It is never called the High Court of Parliament but with reference to his Royal Preſence. It is true, it is the higheſt Court of Judicature, becauſe hither Men may appeal from all inferiour Courts of *Weſtminſter-Hall*; but whether here they may begin original Proceſs, is inquirable. In this ſenſe it is called the Court of Parliament, but not the High Court of Parliament; for the Lords Houſe is a Court of Record, and can adminiſter Oaths, and Fine, *&c.* And it is called the Court of Parliament, when the Lords and Commons join in an Order, but thus never to the Houſe of Commons ſingly; for they can adminiſter no Oath, nor Fine, nor Impriſon, but their own Members; or they may for Violation of their own Privileges commit to their own Serjeant a Foreigner, who hath violated their Privileges. This is ſaid, not to diminiſh

miniſh their ancient and juſt Juriſdictions, nor to leſſen the great Uſe of them, but to keep each Court within its Bounds, which is truly to preſerve the general Peace, and Welfare of the Nation.

In this High Court of Parliament, the King meets with his three States of the Realm, that is to ſay, with the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and the Commons.

The neceſſity of a good Intelligence betwixt the King and his two Houſes of Parliament.

To have Intelligence with this Body of Men, ſurely is one of the greateſt Policies a Prince can ſhew; for by them, he is beſt repreſented unto his People. The Supplies they give him, are beſt payed, when granted by them. Here appears the good Conſtitution of Government, or that harmonious Juſtice (as *Bodin* calls it) of a State, where every Order of Men ſee themſelves repreſented, as Members of the politick Body, or have a Value put on them, or thus, they are not excluded from having an Intereſt in the State. Theſe are the Men, who walk the Perambulations of the Government, and part of whoſe Charge it is, to keep the true and old Boundaries, and Land-marks of the State, and not ſet up new, or who are to guard Prerogative, Privilege and Liberty, ſo as none of them intrench upon the other; for Subjects wound themſelves as much, as they do their Prince, when they invade his Prerogatives.

The Choice of Parliament Men.

Perſons therefore ſent, as the Peoples Repreſentatives, ought, to be choſen out of that Number of Men, which underſtand, and love the Government ſettled, or (as *Ariſtotle* ſays) *Ut ea pars ſit potior, quæ Rempublicam ſanam eſſe vellet, quam ea, quæ nollet*, or that that ſort of Men who deſire the Safety of the Commonwealth ſhould be regarded before thoſe that do not. Who affect not Changes, or who are not popular Orators with ambitious Hearts, deſigning Heads, and ſmooth Tongues, and who would be *Ephori*, *Curatores*, or Tribunes, or King

Controul-

Controulers, who are apt to propoſe violent Remedies, or make Phyſick more pernicious than the Diſeaſe; of whom it may be ſaid, as was ſaid of *Sylla*, *Patriam durioribus remediis, quam pericula erant, ſanavit*, That he had cur'd his Country by Remedies more ſharp than the danger of the Diſeaſe. Such Men as theſe are apter to make remonſtrances to the People, than reaſonable repreſentations to a Prince. And our late Hiſtory of *Charles* the Firſt will ſhew their Temper, for they (even when they were victorious over the King) upon the Stairs of their own Senate-Houſe, wounded and bruiſed by their Soldiers many of their Fellow-Subjects, and thoſe who lived in their own Quarters, for no other reaſon, than that they petitioned them to make Peace with the King. Examine their own Records, what Prerogatives theſe Men uſed over their Fellow-Subjects, and there will be little occaſion to complain of the Cruelty of any of the *Engliſh* Princes. They that teach a Multitude to reſort to their own Strength againſt their Prince, will live (as *London* did) to ſee their own Cannon, or Ordinance by their own Army turn'd upon themſelves, which they mounted to keep out their Prince. But this ſad Example terrifies neither ſide: not the one from Occaſions of Jealouſy about Religion, and properly, nor the other from entertaining again the Spirit of Schiſm and Rebellion. But ariſe, O Lord, and compoſe our Diſtractions. Thus if you ask, what is a wiſe Man, or a People without Liberty, or *Quid Cato ſine Libertate?* You may live to anſwer, what's Liberty without a *Cato?* Or, *Quid Libertas ſine Catone? Tacitus* makes mention of a Sect, who brought forth the *Tuberones* and the *Favonians* (unpleaſing Names to the ancient Common-weal) who to overthrow the State

(ſays he) pretended Liberty; but if they had overthrown it, they would have given an Aſſault to have overthrown Liberty likewiſe. And he commends in another place the good Council of *Sanguinius Maximus*, a Conſul, who deſired the Senators not to increaſe the Emperor's Cares by hunting after matters of Diſlike. The Wiſdom of our Government makes it an Axiome, The King can do no Injury, therefore no Provocation juſtifies Force againſt him. His Miniſters are anſwerable to the Laws; He is exempt, and all this for the Subjects peace. The States of a Land ſhould never repreſent the Grievances of the Land by Microſcopes, for ſuch magnifying Glaſſes do but exaſperate the Humours of the whole Body, and diſcourage the Prince from giving Remedies: for when a Prince diſcerns a willingneſs in ſuch a body, not to miſunderſtand him, it is the beſt way to procure a good Underſtanding with him. Wiſe Men ſhould reflect on the unavoidable Errors or Diſorders in their own Families, before they ſhould aggravate or lay too naked (eſpecially to thoſe that cannot cure them) the Failures of a Government. Nor is it excuſe for theſe Zelot-States-Men to ſay, they act with good Intentions to the Publick; for miſtakes of Judgment may plead both with God and Man for a mitigation of the Puniſhment of an Offence, but never for the Juſtification of an Evil, or illegal Act. Thus Nations are often overthrown by Impatience; ſo dangerous is an over-doing Reformation. But a wiſe Senate makes a happy People and a glorious Prince, by conſidering States like as they do Men, or that they are beſt, not who have no failures, but who have feweſt.

Enemies to the Form of Government, rather than the Governours.

There are times when Men are more willing to caſt off the Form of Government, than the Governours, and ſuch deſigns are with moſt difficulty withſtood. Thus

Thus we ſee, Government (or rather the Juſtice of it) is founded upon the Law of Nature, ſecured by the Word of God, and defended by the Laws of the Land. But we have a great Apoſtle of this Age, or a learned, and ſtrong preſumptuous *Leviathan*, who not founding it upon Nature, makes it ariſe from Neceſſity, and Fear; thus he makes the Government, and the Governours rather the Brat of a miſerable, and frighted People, than the Ordinance of God, ſo weakning the Nature, or Original of Government, and yet one while making the Governour ſuch a *Leviathan*, no ſingle Perſon, or Body of Men is to reſiſt him; for he ſo exalts him, that he may ſet up what Idol, or vain Opinions he will, for a Religion, and all his Subjects are bound to entertain it, and no other, and no Man upon any Occaſion, to riſe againſt him; and yet at laſt if they do reſiſt and prevail, he finds means to juſtify them. Thus he can blow hot, and cold, and we muſt all ſubmit to his Dogma's, or be a fooliſh Generation. But ſo many good Pens have made Remarks upon him, that were it not, to frame a little Scheme, principally for my ſelf, I would not meddle with him at all.

Government how grounded.

Mr. Hobbs *conſidered.*

His Arguments run thus: *Government aroſe upon neceſſity, and upon the Fear one Man had of another's Power, every Man by Birth having an equal Right unto every thing:* ſo the natural Condition of Mankind was a ſtate of War, or Hoſtility with one another. Now this is very ſtrange, that this learned Man ſhould not conſider, if Wolves and Vultures (the fierceſt Beaſts, and Birds of Prey) will not act thus upon their own kind, if Nature (which we may believe, is this Gentleman's God) framed theſe wild Creatures calm to one another, how ſhe ſhould come to be ſuch a Step-dame to Mankind? And if this Gentleman proves

How Mr. Hobbs *makes the Paſſions, and not the moral Vertues, the foundation of Government.*

proves Man's Soul endued with moral Vertues as well as natural Paſſions, why ſhould he make Government ariſe from the Concupiſcible Paſſion of Deſire, and the Iraſcible of Fear, and not from the Cardinal Vertues of Prudence, Temperance, Juſtice, and Fortitude with Humanity and Veracity? Do not theſe moral Vertues evidence, Men were created, not only for a harmleſs, but a beneficial Society? And doth not the neceſſity Man hath of help in relation to his body, ſhew, he was not fram'd to live alone? And in relation to his mind, doth not Temperance reſtrain Deſire, and Fortitude repreſs Fear? How doth Temperance fit him to be contented with a little, and ſo make needleſs the invading the Rights of others? How doth Juſtice regulate his Actions towards other Men, and ſo ſecure them from any Violence from him? How doth Humanity make him apt to relieve anothers Neceſſities, as Juſtice did to preſerve his Rights? How doth his Veracity ſecure another in his Converſation with him? Nor did Art, or Policy, beget theſe Vertues in Mankind, or Nature, but a God of Nature implanted them, in Human Nature; and can this Gentleman believe the Diſorders, that flowed from Injuſtice, were the Mother of Juſtice, though it was often the Mother of good Civil Laws againſt particularized Acts of Injuſtice? Injuſtice wou'd not have been perceived, but as it were a deflection from natural Juſtice; or why doth he ſay, Every Man naturally, upon the fear he had of every other Man, was againſt every other Man, which made it reaſonable for every Man to ſecure himſelf by way of Anticipation (that is, as I conceive, without any other provocation, or injury, but his own fear) by Force and Wiles to maſter all others, 'till he ſaw no other Power great enough to endanger him. His Maſter *Thucydides* ſets forth much

much of this, but allows not the Practice. If this be not prodigy, I know not what is; for if this be true, we will repeat it again, what a Stepmother is Nature (for we will not talk of a God, or an intelligent Mind distinct from, and antecedent to all visible Beings, or of invisible Powers, which seem to him but as Scare crows set up to fright fearful and ignorant Men) who made this kind of Creature Man, miserable by its primitive designation; and yet by, or upon experience of his own Misery, how came Man reasonable enough by Laws and Penalties to find a means lodged in himself to divert the Evil Nature had subjected him unto? Thus the Effect seems superiour to the Cause; for if Man can thus excel his own Nature, how comes it about that other Creatures cannot do the like? Or how comes Man to be wiser by submitting his own Understanding and Strength to a Governour to provide better for himself, than Nature did? Did Nature produce him to a State of War, and he find out the benefit of Society in Peace? Pray then, why should not a Horse do the like, and find he was turn'd out of the Orchard where was long Grass, into the barren Common, for cropping the Trees? Or why should not Bees and Wasps make Leagues together, and one give some of their Honey to avoid Hostility? By all this we see, how fatal it is for Men of strong natural Parts, and good Literature, to entertain false Principles, and how false Principles about Nature produce falser about Policy. Judge *Hales* hath convinced this Gentleman in his Origination of Mankind in point of natural Philosophy, and the Lord Chancellor *Hyde* hath done it as well about his Politicks; and Doctor *Parker*, in his Ecclesiastical Polity, hath shewed the absurdity of this Gentleman's Opinion about Religion, and Civil Policy;

If Mr. Hobbs his way of stating this Question be true, the Creature is wiser than the Creator.

Policy; and therefore I'll rather give Men warning of him, than enter farther the Liſts, or I would not farther fall upon one, whom many others have attack'd in ſo maſterly a manner.

God made Government his own Ordinance, and made Governours owe their Authority to him; for it is by him that Princes reign; for Promotion neither comes from the Eaſt, nor from the Weſt, for it is God that ſets up one, and pulls down another. He cloathed them with Power and Majeſty, as the neceſſary Supports of all Government; for without theſe no Perſonal Vertues of the Prince would be able to ſupport him, or with a heady, and miſtaking Multitude to give that Obedience, which Government cannot want.

God veſted Government with Power and Majeſty.

Power therefore is ſingly lodged in him (or them) in whom the Sovereignty is lodged; and if there be no Sovereignty, or a Power from which there is no Appeal, there is no Government, for the Rights of Sovereignty muſt be uncontroulable; for if God were not omnipotent, Men would not be guided by his Wiſdom; for we ſee Men queſtioning his Decrees every day not content with his Juſtice; for how many diſreliſh his Determination of not reſiſting evil Governours, though it were made in behalf of themſelves, as the beſt means to ſecure their common Peace, and publick Intereſt? A great part of the Office of a Governour is to reward and puniſh; yet herein if Power fenced it not, every one would ſhare with his Prince, or diſpenſe theſe themſelves, and become Judges, or give Sentence (nay Executioners too) in their own Caſes. Where Rewards and Puniſhments are not well diſpens'd, Loyalty and Faithfulneſs will both quit a Court. And *Boccalini* makes thoſe Vertues rather to retire to a Dog-kennel, than return thither; for the Creature (ſays he) hath ſome gratitude and ſenſe

Power.

of

of being well uſed, and therefore theſe Virtues quitted the Court, and went thither. Thus the diſpenſing Rewards, and Puniſhments being ſo eminent a Branch of a Prince's Power, he ſhould truſt it in no hand, to diſtribute them, but his own. All Natures (but God's) wanting ſomewhat, are moved or attracted by Rewards, and deterred by Puniſhments. For Puniſhments, were added unto Laws, that whom Conſcience would not reſtrain, preſent Pain, and loſs might.

Majeſty. Majeſty is the Glory of Power reflected, or it is a Reſult of the amplitude of Greatneſs directed to bring Awe and Reverence towards Authority; for Majeſty is but a ſeeming pageantry, when Power upholds it not, and where every one can approach it without reſpect; for ſays the Politician *Majeſtas major è Longinquo*; Majeſty appears greater from afar for when a Prince, by ſome unſeeming Familiarity of ſome Favourite, abates, or lets fall his own Majeſty, every one that thinks as well of himſelf, as the Prince doth of the Favourite, forgets his Duty, and becomes ſawcy. And thus when a Prince abates of the Reverence, which ought to be paid to his Perſon, he ſeldom finds it paid unto his Affairs. It's good for a Prince by a Reputation of Mildneſs, lodg'd in him rather by his Diſcretion, then natural Temper, to abate in his Subjects in general the Fear of his Power; for that will be thought the juſter, when he is ſharp upon a particular Man, that demerits; but to let fall his Majeſty, warrants low Thoughts of him among the generality. Thus Princes, though as Men they muſt live as Men, yet by reaſon of the Dignity of their Office, they muſt either abſtain from, or uſe theſe Familiarities in private, or be prejudiced in

in their Regal Station; and the Perſon to whom the Prince communicates theſe Favours, if he be either vain, or inſolent upon them (which is a hard task, not to be) he draws upon himſelf an inſupportable Envy, and a great Diminution upon his Maſter's Reputation.

The Prince the true repreſentative of a Nation.

The full Glory of a Nation (or its Majeſty) is drawn, as in a Burning-Glaſs, into one point in the Perſon of the King; and therefore if he let it fall himſelf, or any Subject, by abuſe of his Favour, darken it, it's an Offence againſt the Publick.

How his Power, and how his Majeſty, are both neceſſary.

The Office of a King, or Supreme Governors, is to govern Multitudes of People, and they are heady, refractory and unſteady, like Horſes apt to be reſty, without they find their Riders faſt in the Saddle, and themſelves commanded by the Bit, and Spur, or under a Power, and thus Power is neceſſary. And Common People, like Children, are delighted with Glorious and Gay Things, and thus Majeſty is neceſſary; ſo as the reverence of Civil Government is upheld much by the Splendour of Majeſty. For without this, popular Fancy will not be pleas'd, nor ſatisfy'd, for which reaſon Greatneſs ever ſtands in need of ſome ſenſible Luſtre. Thus as there is a real neceſſity of Power, ſo, conſidering how ſtrong Fancy is in Multitudes, there is a neceſſity, Majeſty be as little neglected, as Power.

The perſonal Virtues of a Prince.

Power and Majeſty are the two great Supports of Sovereignty, but are beſt upheld by two Perſonal Virtues, *viz*, that of Piety, and that of Juſtice.

Piety.

Piety leads a Prince to believe, he is accountable unto God for the Adminiſtration of his High Office, and it leads the Subject to believe, that that Prince, who acknowledges a greater

Power than his own, and *that* that a *Divine* Power, is like to uſe his own unto good Ends; It bows his own Heart unto God, and his Subjects unto himſelf; or it diſpoſes him to live well, and his Subjects to obey willingly. It makes him watchful in the diſcharge of his own Office, and reſolute againſt thoſe that invade him in it. It is the beſt directreſs both of his Power, and Majeſty; for it keeps Power from Cruelty, and Majeſty from diſdaining of others. It makes a Prince value the Divine Providence, that watches over him more than his Guards; knowing without this, Civil Wiſdom, or Military Power very often miſcarry. Indeed the Vices of Princes always turn to their own Puniſhment. For they that imitate them in their Vice, are apteſt to diſquiet them in their Government, and thus they diſhearten good Subjects, to uphold them, and encourage ill, to rebel againſt themſelves.

Juſtice.

Juſtice as it flows from Piety, ſo it is upheld by Power. Juſtice muſt appear, or be known, to be armed, or it is too like to be diſputed in its Execution. Men entred into Society, that they might enjoy the Benefit of it, and when it is obſtructed, a Commonwealth is ſick; if generally it be not adminiſtred, the Band of Society is diſſolved; the Execution of it is the Life of the Laws. No Arbitrary Power, or Deciſion, or Reaſon of State muſt want Juſtice; for the ſtanding Laws, and the Arbitrary Determinations of Sovereignty muſt both be reaſonable and juſt; the one may decline the Formalities, or Forms of Proceſs, which the other is tied unto, but juſtice muſt be the Life and Spirit of them both, and therefore they have narrow Thoughts, that think what is Arbitrary is Unjuſt; for when it is the determination of a good, and a wiſe Man, it's very often more perfect, than the Law it ſelf,

becauſe made a Rule, after the inconvenience of the Law is perceived, or wiſe Men would make it a Law, or give it a Sanction as ſoon as propoſed. So as I ever thought, the binding the Judges, or their binding themſelves too ſtrictly unto the Letter of the Law, and Formality of Words, and ſpellings in Pleadings, was like ſtrait Ligatures, which hinder juſt Circulation of Humours; for it is one thing to leave the Judge too looſe, but its another (more nocent) to tye him up too ſtrait: this ſets up diſtinct Courts of Equity, and that multiplies Suits, and many other Inconveniences. Keep an ill, or corrupt Man from being a Judge; ſoon remove him, when it is perceived, nay ſeverely puniſh, but pinion him not ſo, as he muſt ſit and ſee the Craft of a Sollicitor or an Attorney evade the true meaning of the Law. In ſuch a Caſe let him (as well as the Party pinch'd by the Subtilty of the Plea) have a liberty to put the Caſe to a ſummary Deciſion of all the Benches, which he finds not fit to determine in his own Court.

Faithfulneſs.

Faithfulneſs in a Prince is but a part of his Juſtice; *Lying Lips* (ſays *Solomon*) *become not a Prince*; and the reaſon is, that he that hath a generous Heart will not ſtand in need of a falſe Mouth. A Prince ought to be clothed with Reputation, which no Man inwardly can render to him, on whom he cannot depend, or whoſe Word he cannot rely on.

But becauſe neceſſarily there muſt be granted unto Men in Civil Affairs, and in Kingly Policies, a greater Latitude than ought to be allowed in common Converſation, not of dealing falſly, but demeaning a Mans ſelf ſagaciouſly: therefore Princes, and Ambaſſadors, who know, what weights are uſed, ſeldom expect other Coin, than that which is mixt with an Allay, which though it

it debaſeth the Mettal, yet makes it work the better. Chancellor *Bacon* diſtinguiſhes well betwixt Simulation, and Diſſimulation (indeed the diſtinction is *Cicero*'s, in his Offices, *lib.* 3.) making the firſt but an Art of State, or an Art of Life, as *Tacitus* calls it an Art of living among Men, that diſſemble, The other a falſe Profeſſion, by which (I think) he means Falſity, when he profeſſes Sincerity: which ſurely is a falſe Policy, and no ways allowable; the firſt he aſſigns unto *Auguſtus*, the ſecond unto *Tiberius*. The firſt is but the Art of a well managed Horſe, who obſerving the Hand knows how to ſtop on a ſuddain. Undoubtedly when a Prince believes he is clearly dealt with, he ſhould be as clear in his dealing: For tho' their Condition exempts them from that openneſs, and round Dealing, which is the honour of a private Man's Nature, yet the importance of their Obligations reaching unto the Good or Harm of ſo many private Men, they are admitted to have more of the Serpentine Windings, than would become a private Man. Equivocations muſt neceſſarily be diſ-allowed by all Men in Treaties; but Reſervedneſs in Speech, or Diverſion in Diſcourſe, which otherwiſe would diſcloſe a meaning too ſoon: A ſpeaking that for his own Opinion, which he avers, not to be his Maſter's Inſtruction: a ſubtilty of extracting the others thoughts, and yet concealing his own: to be cautious in the beginning of a Treaty, ſo he be ſincere and open in the Concluſion of it: All theſe are ſeemly in an Ambaſſador, which would be very blameable among private Men, eſpecially Friends. "The beſt Compoſition, ſays a "great Man, is Openneſs in Fame, Secrecy in Ha"bit; for Nakedneſs, ſays he, as little becomes a Mind, as a Body. Hiſtories, and Civilians give greater Latitude unto Princes, to diſcharge themſelves

How Embaſſadors ought to manage themſelves in Treaties.

ſelves of the Obligation of their Treaties, than exact Morality will allow of. I remember ſeveral Inſtances in Dr. *Zouch*, and particularly of Queen *Elizabeth*, who ſaid plainly, ſhe meant ſincerely, when ſhe treated; but having promiſed an Aſſiſtance farther than would ſtand with her own Treaſure, and her Peoples Safety, ſhe could not bind her ſelf to the extremity of her Articles; She was ready to ſhew, ſhe meant not in her Treaty, to deceive; nor did ſhe then intend to bear the ill Conſequences, which ſhe now diſcerned.

Clemency. Clemency is a chief part of Humanity, and ſhould ever be found in a Prince; becauſe moſt Men at one time or another, ſtand in need of a Prince's Goodneſs. But to make it valuable, this Virtue ſhould proceed from Generoſity, not Facility of his Nature; and he muſt be careful, that neither his natural good Temper, no nor his moral Clemency appear, to take off the Terror of his political Juſtice. His Clemency will ſufficiently appear, if it reſtrain him from frequent Severities; for it is neither for the Honour of the Prince, nor of the Phyſician, when their Patients are ſent in numbers to the burial Places. Clemency withſtands not Severity, though ſhe endeavours to uſe it ſeldom; for a Prince may be very clement in his Diſpoſition, nay in his Judgment and uſual Practice, and yet be very ſevere upon Provocations that warrant the ſame; for ſuch a well uſed Severity the better illuſtrates his Clemency. But it is much better for a Prince to pardon an Offence againſt his Perſon, than againſt his Government, or againſt a private Subjects Intereſt, or Right: And nothing can worſe become a Prince's Bounty, or Clemency, than to grant Pardons to Offenders, as Donatives or Rewards to Servants. It is much better to give them the Forfeiture of an Offender's Eſtate, for that is an Eſcheat to himſelf,

himſelf, than a Pardon to an Offender, for that is ſelling of Juſtice. A Pardon is either not fit to be given at all, or to be done freely, that ſo it may be a real Act of Clemency, and make the Offender grateful, or upon a ſecond Fault more guilty.

Modeſty is a Virtue of ſo mean a ſound, that it may ſeem derogatory to attribute it to a Prince; but if well interpreted, it is a Flower in his Crown; for it is a high-ſpirited Virtue, tempering Greatneſs, or Power towards Men of inferiour Condition; or it is a generous diſpoſition in a Prince, not to dazle a private Man with the Glory of his Majeſty, nor to create in him Fear by the Terror of his Power: ſo it muſt needs be attractive both of Love and Reverence, rendring the Prince acceſſible, and making him unapt to put a Neglect, or Affront upon the meaneſt Man, ſince the meaneſt may do the greateſt a ſhrewd turn, for *Nihil tam firmum eſt, cui periculum non ſit, etiam ab invalido.* *Modeſty.*

Beſides, Modeſty is a great Antidote againſt Flattery, the common bane of Princes, and the Flattery that is made unto their Buſineſs and Affairs, is often greater and more pernicious than that which is made unto their Perſons: for the one is but ſcratching an Itch of a prurient Temper or Blood, but the other is endangering the Publick Peace or Security. Flattery of a Prince's Perſon is but like a painted Flower that pleaſes the Eye, but offends the Smell; but Flattery of his Buſineſs is like a chymical Vapour, that ſtupifies the Brain. But in both kinds Princes love to draw it upon themſelves; for ſuch as ſeem to admire their Perſons, and applaud or concur in their Councils, they take to be their Friends; and the Reaſon of it is, they love rather to have their Hopes fortified, than their Dangers awak'd, for they affect to cheriſh Hope and ſtifle Fear, and

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are not patient of deliberating or examining a matter by contrary Judgments, or Men of ſeveral Conceptions, or divers Tempers, Educations, or Intereſts; For oppoſite Opinions are like the Teeth of a File, it muſt ſcrape off before it can ſmooth an Affair, whilſt ſeveral concording Judgments too often make an Affair pleaſant and hopeful in the beginning, though more commonly irkſome and ſhameful at the latter end of it. *Xerxes* never knew the value of his Councellor *Demaxatus*, until he had made his ſhameful retreat out of *Greece*; then he found what the other had told him, that there was much difference between a great Multitude and a well diſciplin'd Army, whether it were to fight, or to ſubſiſt: and then he knew the Accidents that attended upon the one in marching through *Straights*, and finding Proviſion, and the uſefulneſs and ſervices of the other. And for the honour of this King it is, that he valued this ſingle Man more than he did all his other Councellors when returned home. But when Obſervations of this kind are never ſo much multiplyed, Princes Courts will never be cured of this King's Evil, but they will favour thoſe, who Councel towards what they love; and never have in Eſteem thoſe, who by projecting the worſt, and foreſeeing ill Conſequences, or cautioning againſt Dangers, evidence they love their Maſter's Honour and Succeſs in Affairs better than they do their own Preferments: for Flattery is the beſt Court-pick-lock, and plainneſs of Speech the ſureſt bar againſt a Man's own Preferment. Modeſty hath this farther good operation upon a Prince, that it minds him of the incertainty of Events in the beſt laid and proſecuted Deſigns, there being a common Viciſſitude or change of Fortune, which wiſe Men (like *Porus*) will diſcern and laugh at even in

their

their Captivity, becauſe thereby they diſcern, *Quam caduca ſit Fœlicitas humana*, as *Curtius* expreſſes it, or how fading and falling a Leafe Proſperity is.

Liberality, or Bounty is much cried up in a Prince, and is very becoming Greatneſs and Majeſty; for Men would not love the Sun, or Heavenly Bodies for their own Glory and Heat, if they conveyed not unto them, and other Creatures cheering Light, and benign Influences. But it requires Prudence in a high meaſure to guide it; for if it run into the intrinſick Eſtate of a Prince, or make him poor, that others may be vainly rich, it diſcredits him more, than it honours him, and loſes its name, for it is termed prodigality. Even he that is benefited by it, deſpiſes him for it, looking rather on it as a weakneſs, than a greatneſs of mind; and it obliges unto no thankfulneſs, if what is looſely or inconſiderately given obliges to ſuch Expences, or ſplendid courſe of life (which ſome Princes affect from thoſe they are thus bountiful unto) that they can lay up nothing for themſelves and Children: Money being like Meat, if a Man muſt eat or ſwallow till he regorge it, he will find a Philoſopher's Supper better than a Prince's Feaſt. If Favourites of Pleaſure be the Objects of Bounty, then the Subjects ſhut the purſe from ſupplying him, who feeds ſo many Vermine, and on whom ſuch Vermine hang; let their Food be never ſo good, the Mien or Countenance never is florid. Or if exceſſive Bounty unto ſome few make Servants loſe their ſmall Penſions, Wages, or Diets, it aliens the Affections, and chills the Duty of thoſe many other Attendants towards the Maſter. Indeed Bounty to ſuch Men ſhould be only waſte Water; when the Exchequer can ſupply the ordinary Expences, Bounty is then, and not until

Liberality.

then ſeemly; nor ſhould Bounty unto Favourites, or Expences of Pleaſure deprive deſerving Servants, or Subjects, of Rewards, ſuch as have merited of the State in home or foreign Affairs, for to theſe a Prince may laudibly appear rather poor than not bountiful; yet for theſe he muſt not weaken the publick Revenue, which in all Nations is reputed ſacred; but the caſual Revenue, and the Offices in the Gift of the Crown, the Leaſes even of the Demeſns, and things of this Nature are wiſely here diſpoſed. But in giving Honours and Eſtates in Perpetuity, if any one made his Reflections, how many noble Families owed both to the Crown, and yet in this laſt Age have contributed much to pull it down, one would put no great price upon Gratitude, or Princes might well think it fit to put ſome new Rules unto their Bounties. Rewards unto ſome Perſons, which far exceed the Merit of the Perſon, make others much undervalue what they receive, though they receive with an over-meaſure: and if their Reward come unto them more from the Interpoſition of a great Man, than the Prince's own Diſpoſition, the former will have the thanks; and thus a Prince buys but a Servant for a great Man. Sir *Dudley Diggs* in his Preface unto Secretary *Walſingham*'s Letters obſerves, that Queen *Elizabeth* was better ſerved for a Penſion of 40 *l*, *per Annum*, than King *James* for an Annuity of 400 *l*.

Frugality. Frugality in a Prince is an univerſal Bounty to all his People, for it enables a Prince to live without, or at leaſt to crave leſs Aids; and a Prince's care to promote Trade, Manufactures, Husbandry, *&c*, or prevent Confederacy among Men of a Trade, as Graziers, Butchers, *&c*, or Monopolizers, who ſet the Price, or Dice (as we call it) upon all Buyers, is to be numbred among

mong Bounties which reach to the whole body of the People. So as the Kingly Office is an Inſtrument of Bounty and Frugality both, for by one and the ſame means, he inriches his own People and ſaves his own Treaſure. Men of this Temper are leaſt preſt upon, for no Man judges better, when and unto whom it is fit to give, than that Prince that ſeeks to make his People Rich, rather by his Providence and by their own Induſtries and Frugalities, than by his Coffers; for it is a very ill Symptome in a State, when every broken Fortune hopes to make it ſelf up from a King's Exchequer. Thus Frugality is a Key unto the Subjects Treaſure, for the People willingly lend the Key of theirs unto a Prince that keeps the Lock of his own; and as unwillingly to one who ſpends upon his Favourites what is his own, or what his Subjects ſupply him with, ſince the Humour of ſuch Times and Expences infects the Country as well as the Court, and ſo they will rail againſt the Vices that are ſo coſtly unto them; and if ſuch an Expenſiveneſs leads towards a general Poverty, it will in a ſhort time draw on a general Defection.

Yet Courts muſt not want their Splendor, for that is a part of a Prince's Majeſty, and the very Silks and fine Linen of it, the back and the board of a few Courtiers feed the Belly, and ſet on work the hands of many Vulgars. It was obſerved to be impolitick in the Emperor *Julian* (and accordingly complain'd of, that he affected to appear in his Court more a Philoſopher, than a Prince, baniſhing the Officers of Shews and Vanity, of Cooks, Barbers, and Taylors, *&c.*

Love of Fame was implanted in Men unto the end they might love Vertue, ſince there is no greater Evidence, than that where the one is de- *Love of Fame.*

ſpiſed, the other is neglected; for though the Perſon of a Man in a ſhort time will be forgot, his Deeds with reflection on him will be remembred. Hence it is too many Men will rather wound their Conſciences than their Fame, yet many make it the cheapeſt thing they are concern'd in. Neglect of Fame begets Remiſsneſs in Government; for he that cares little how Men look upon him, cares leſs what he doth, ſays that witty, and pleaſant, and yet often ſerious *Spaniard* QUEVEDO. *If Chriſt himſelf thought fit to ask his Diſciples, what ſay Men of me? Nay unto his Apoſtle St.* Peter, *what ſay you of me? It may become the Wiſdom of the greateſt Prince to make the ſame Enquiries.* It is diſagreeable unto Nature to be unconcern'd in Fame, ſince the God of Nature made it a reſtraint upon a vicious courſe of life, or a means to keep Men out of bad Company, or out of thoſe courſes which expoſe him to be undervalued; for not only looſeneſs of Life, but remiſsneſs in Affairs, or raſh entring upon important Actions, and faintly proſecuting them, or uncertainty of Mind, and unevenneſs of Counſels (all which uſually are attended with unſucceſsfulneſs) draw down Infamy upon a great Man. And when a Prince hath loſt the inward Reverence, which is due unto the Generoſity of his Mind, the outward, which is paid unto his Perſon, will ſoon appear a ſhadow which forſakes the Dial with the Sun-ſhine. It is unlooſing the Girdle of Government (*ſolvens Cingulum Regum*) to withdraw an inward eſteem from a Prince. Shall Jealouſy of a Subject's Reputation awaken a Prince? Shall he think it his concern, that this Man be not overprized, and yet be unconcerned that he himſelf is reputed no way valuable? Since no Men are concerned for a Prince,

Prince they value not, how inſecure doth Contempt of Fame render him?

Yet Princes, or Great Men, are not to think a laſting Fame is a good Fame, ſince the word *famous* is an equivocal word, and Men may be famous for bad as well as good Actions. *Judas* is as well recorded as St. *Peter*; and *Heroſtratus*, who burnt *Diana*'s Temple only to keep up his Name, loſt his eſteem amongſt Men, and had almoſt loſt his Name likewiſe. *Alexander* the *Great*, and *Julius Cæſar*, and the great and proſperous Neighbour Prince of our Times affected Fame, but they underſtood it not, for her Trumpet ſounds, and recommends Heroick, Noble, and Vertuous Actions, or Actions that benefited Mankind, not ſuch whoſe Effects and Proſperity were only like a Storm at Sea, or a plaguy Year, which are regiſtred in the Kalendar for the deſtruction they made, and the harm they did. How much more hath a private Man to thank God for, that he made him an Inſtrument of a little Good unto a few Men, than the greateſt Prince in the World hath, that he was an univerſal Peſt, and that upon his own choice? The Folly of ſuch a Conceit appears in this, that he thinks he ſhall preſerve the memory of his Perſon (unto which he is fondly indulgent) by it, when Fame reaches (as that great Man *Boethius* ſays) no farther than unto his Actions, ſo as if they be not beautiful and ſhapely, though he were another *Abſalom*, Fame will but ſet him as a Traytor. *Boccalini* hath a good repreſentation of the Shame and Infamy of black ſucceſsful Deeds, when he repreſents Duke *Sforza* of *Milan* demanding a Triumph of *Apollo*, and it being granted him, upon the condition that the Families he had unjuſtly betray'd, and tyrannically ruined, ſhould

be placed about the Wheels of his Chariot; the Shame thereof cured this Itch of Vanity, and he declined his Triumph, that he might conceal the ways or means that enabled him to pretend to it. This may be a true Reaſon, why God removed the repreſentations of Mens Perſons from Fame, and by it engraved only their Actions; for it was the Vertues of the Mind he took care to recommend to Poſterity, and he deſign'd nothing to be memorable and renowned, but what was fit to be imitated. So as Fame was by God's appointment to preſerve the memory of his great and good Deeds, unto whoſe Perſon God deſign'd a Reward from himſelf in another World, if not in this likewiſe. And yet a good Fame makes a Man live after his death; for the Honour other Men pay unto his Memory, whoſe Perſon they have no notion of, renders him to them as if he were ſtill a living Example of Vertue. The appetite of Honour is rooted even in Nature it ſelf; and therefore if Men be careful how they get it, they may be ſollicitous to get it, becauſe alive and dead it benefits others as well as themſelves, and becauſe it is obſervable, that thoſe Men who care not what others think of them, care as little what they do themſelves.

Prudence. Prudence is a Prince's Maſter-Vertue, indeed it is a private Man's chief Honour: in all Civil, Military, and Eccleſiaſtical Affairs, it's the great Directreſs; it weighs all Circumſtances, and foreſees the moſt probable Events; for where there is the moſt of Prudence, there is the leaſt of Chance; for *Summa ratione geſta Fortuna ſequitur, Fortune follows things concerted with the greateſt Reaſon.*

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It is the Diſtraction of a Man's mind, that he hath ſo many repreſentations of one and the ſame thing, like a Picture, if he look upon it by one light it ſeems one thing unto him, if by another light, it ſeems to vary its Figure; In it ſelf an Affair may be one thing, but cloathed in its various Circumſtances, it's another; ſo as many ways ſeem to lead unto it, and yet really there is but one, and this path Prudence only can walk in; for the prudent Man, like the Chymiſt, can ſeparate Bodies that are mix'd, and incorporate together, and which are indiſcernable unto a vulgar Eye. In Civil Affairs he is the beſt Chymiſt, who hath moſt Experience; for though Men may be ingenuous without it, yet ſeldom ſolid or expedite, and yet all the Sciences ſerve him much; for the prudent Prince will ſtand in need of natural Philoſophy to judge of the natural Conſtitutions and Tempers of Men, as well as moral, to know how to improve, govern, or reſtrain the Tempers of thoſe whom he intruſts with his Affairs; elſe an impetuoſity of Temper will blind Reaſon, and tranſport him, who diſcerns his own Infirmities, and yet hath not been accuſtomed to bridle them. An eloquent and deſigning Man will be followed by Multitudes, when a ſober and well-weighing Judgment will too often want a Companion. A prudent Man is apter to ſuſpect his own Advice, than another Man's of whoſe Integrity he is ſatisfied, ſince he may with reaſon ſuſpect his own Judgment, becauſe every one needs to ſee his own Thoughts through ſome other Medium, than his own way of reaſoning, the Phancy and the Judgment being too nigh of kin to be ſevere upon each other; which made *Balſac* determine, that

that it was too often the ſhame and reproach of human Wiſdom, that the greateſt Minds being wholly left unto themſelves in the greateſt Affairs, were likelieſt to commit the groſſeſt Errors; and therefore the prudent Man is far from being an overweaning, or overcautious Man: And thus Prudence recommends Modeſty.

Choice of Officers.

Nothing therefore more manifeſts the Prudence of a Prince, than the Choice of his Councellors and Subordinate Miniſters of State, and Domeſtick Servants, and Favourites. For the Office of a Prince is well performed in his Perſon, when he hath choſen good Miniſters, and Servants; For thus it hath been ſaid already: He is not the worſt Prince, who is the worſt Man, but he that hath the worſt Inſtruments to work by, for the Tools uſually ſhew the Artiſt. For a Prince for Money, or Favour, to bring undeſerving Men into Offices of great Truſt is to gratify the deſires of his Enemies, for they wiſh nothing more.

Of Choice of Councellors about a Prince.

It is a great Evidence of a Princes own Abilities, to be able to chuſe a good Counſellor, and of his Virtue, not to render ſuch a Counſellor uſeleſs to himſelf; for he that will receive Counſel muſt have no pretincture, or preingagement, or no Biaſs, which may draw him off from judging, what is ſaid unto him. He muſt have no petty-Counſellors or Favourites of Pleaſure, to ſtagger his Reſolutions by Whiſpers. He muſt ſhut his Ears unto Flatterers, for if he once believe that ſort of Men, in what they ſay in Commendation of himſelf, he will ſoon believe them in what they ſay againſt others: So as *Julian*'s reply unto a Man, that highly commended him was very remarkable, *When*, Sir,

Sir, ſays he, "You have told me as freely of my "Faults, as you have of the Excellencies you pre- "tend to ſee in me, then I will give belief to what "you ſay now. And *Ariſtotle*'s Epiſtle unto *Alexander* is moſt remarkable, wherein he told him, He was moſt glad to underſtand, that he was not as too many Princes were, ſo ſcornful, and unreaſonable, as to make good Advice ridiculous. This was worthy of ſo great a Man's taking notice of, for nothing makes ſerious Men ſooner deſert a Princes Intereſt, then to be under a ſlighted Character; for *Cicero* in his Offices obſerves, many Men will loſe their Lives for a Prince, who will not loſe their Reputations. I once heard theſe Buffoons, that thus pleaſed a Prince, called by a ſerious Gentleman the Petards of a Court; for ſaid he, by repreſenting any Man in a Diſguiſe, or Maſquerade, they will blow up his Credit preſently.

If a Prince have a known Biaſs, he will too ſoon be obſerved, and a Common Underſtanding at a Court will make that appear Wiſdom, which really is but Flattery; for there is ſcarce any one Maxim in Policy which is not combated by ſome other; therefore they that ſtudy their own preferment or Security, not their Princes Eſtabliſhment or Honour, will ſoon find the weaker Reaſon that gratifies the ſtronger Paſſion of a Prince, is ever accepted, and rewarded, when the ſtronger Reaſon is miſinterpreted, as a diſſaffection. Princes therefore muſt diſcountenance a Man's Advice; for a wiſe Prince, like a good Huntſman, muſt encourage the Dog that hunts for the Scent as well as he that hits it. And Counſel, that is ſincere, muſt be grateful, and the Counſellor if he ſpeak in private, his Counſel muſt be kept in private; for if the Prince

Prince expoſe him to a contrary Faction, it will create that Caution, that he will want Freedom of Advice, when the other wants his ſecurity in adviſing. Thus Princes muſt not call their Councellors as *Xerxes* did, and then tell them, "He "call'd them, to bring obedient Minds not trou- "bleſome debates: And if a Prince would be well adviſed, he muſt adviſe early, for there is no Comfort to ſay, Sir, the Time is paſt, or it's too late now to think on it. A Prince ſhould have no Councellor to be ſo mean, as to be a reproach unto him, nor ſo lofty as to reproach him; for the very Errors of a Prince are to be concealed, or reſpectfully laid open before him, and to be as much as may be concealed from others.

My Lord *Bacon* "Says, a Prince ſhould have "but few, and thoſe well choſen Counſellors, that "they may carry on his Buſineſs with one Spirit "of Direction; therefore he obſerves Wiſe *Henry* the Seventh made uſe only of Biſhop *Morton*, and Biſhop *Fox*. Over greatneſs in one, or over ſtrict Combination in a few may be both dangerous to him. He may keep his Ear open unto many, but he muſt not let them run into Factions againſt one another, if he hope to be ſerved by any, for they will wreak their ſpight againſt one another at the price of his diſſervice; if both concur not in his Buſineſs, he deceives himſelf if he thinks he hath uſe of either. If he carry himſelf with indifference unto their particular Concerns, he may make uſe both of their Advices and Intereſts unto his own Service. And any other way of managing Factions and keeping them at odds, unto my obſervation was never uſeful unto any Prince; if either of them have a predominancy with him, at leaſt ſo by turns

turns as one checks the other, both deſerve him.

The beſt way of a Prince to know the Nature of him he would make a Counceller of, is, to know him by Domeſticks, and Neighbours, and general Vogue; for from theſe no Man can conceal himſelf, or his natural Inclinations. Enemies will traduce him, Friends overvalue him, but theſe (if what they ſay flow naturally from themſelves) beſt diſcover him. And the Councellor's nature is as much to be conſidered as his Abilities; for tho' Princes moſt commonly beſt eſteem of Subtil Men, it is moral good Men beſt advance their Service; for a Mind not ſeaſoned with Morality, like the delicateſt Wines, will beſt pleaſe the Taſt for a time, but ſoon grow prick'd, or Sower, or ſome trick they will play at laſt, harms more than any of their Services do good.

Characters of a Councellor.

When Piety therefore is joined unto natural Abilities, ripeneſs of Age, and good Experience, (as early having entred into Buſineſs) then a Prince may expect, not only an able, but a faithful Councellor. If Piety be wanting, Abilities will turn but unto Compliances, and ſelf ends or ſerving ſome Faction rather than the Prince; for Moral Virtue is the only reſtraint upon ſelf Intereſt. Abilities deſtitute of Piety ſeldom advance a Prince's Service, and he is likelieſt beſt to ſerve his Prince on Earth, who ſerves his God in Heaven, for Piety only can reſtrain the ill Effects of Ambition, or Covetouſneſs, or lead a Man to prefer his Maſter's Service more than any Proviſion for Wife and Children. It is the Honour of *Cardinal Toledo*, that he refuſed to be of the King's Councel, without he might declare God's Will in oppoſition untothe Impiety

of modern Policies. Without natural Abilities in a Councellor, Men expect a harveſt without having ſowed the Field, and if it were ſowed, and the Seed Corn not good (*viz.* ſowed with Principles Epicurean, Machiavillian or Hobbiſts) they will never ſerve to govern a free People, they may to render Men Slaves. If Councellors be not grave, and Aged Perſons, they that are to obey their Councils, will not reverence them, or cheerfully ſubmit, for young Men muſt want Experience, and without Experience the beſt Abilities will be ſubject unto groſs Errors. A States-Man, or indeed any Man in any Courſe of Life, muſt be broken unto Buſineſs (or *compu aux Affaires)* before any other Man can confidently depend on him, for he is not to be depended on, to guide an Affair that hath not ſeen both ſides of Fortune, or met with diſaſters as well as good Succeſſes, or obſerved them carefully in Hiſtory. When young Men give the Counſel, the matter of it is moſt commonly violent; for their Temper leads either unto raſh and daring things, ſuch as may endanger the Settlement of the preſent State (which no wiſe Prince for increaſe of Juriſdiction, or Prerogative ſhould ever adventure) or unto Wit, or Reparties, which are proper for Diſcourſes at a Table, but not for the gravity of a Council-board; for commonly they gain their Eſteem by Judgments they make on things paſt, or by Reflection on an Affair in general, not by Councels or Determinations on ſomewhat that is preſent and particular. Indeed it is a great Miracle to think Men with Wit, with ſome mixture of Latin, and Greek, or Foreign Languages make the propereſt Perſons for Buſineſs. A great Man both of Wit and Learning *Thucidydes* determines

mines againſt it: *Hebetiores, quam Viri Acutiores melius Rempublicam adminiſtrant:* The more Grave rather than the more Acute ſort of Men, make the beſt Miniſters of a Commonwealth. Young and witty Men have too much phancy, to examine their own Judgment, and their warm temper makes them perſecute an Affair with eagerneſs at Firſt, and remiſneſs towards the End, *aeriis initiis, ſed incurioſo Fine*, and they are too likely, raſhly to run into Errors, and by unſeaſonable Remedies to endeavour the Cure, or *ab intempeſtivis remediis delicta accendunt*, I uſe the Author's Words (though the method of writing be out of faſhion) becauſe I would ſtrengthen my ſelf with their Authorities. Beſides, young and witty Men value themſelves much, by being not reſtrained by ancient forms of Buſineſs, for uſually they find ſome way more expedite, and ſeemingly more reaſonable, which uſually upon Trial is found otherwiſe, for they argue their own change, or what they make is a State of Melioration; but they foreſee not the inconveniences which attend upon their own project, whilſt *Thucidydes* obſerves the Nations which were leſs prone, to change their Cuſtoms, were moſt commonly eſteemed the wiſeſt. Beſides Men of this Age, and Temper, as they are moſt inclined to be vain-glorious, ſo leſs capable of Secrecy; whilſt Age, and Experience render Men apter to give wholeſome than complying Councel, as not to be too ſtrictly tyed unto old Forms and Cuſtoms, ſo not to part with them, but upon great Examination; all which is the Evidence of a judicious Mind.

Nothing therefore Characters a Counſellor better than that it may be truly ſaid of him, he is a ſincere Man, or as we ſay of a good Common-

wealths Man: He is one that prefers the publick Concern before his own private Intereſt. So a good Councellor will in Affairs that are Important, rather conſider his Maſter's Service, than his Maſter's Inclination; and that I may ſet down all the Extremities of Integrity at once (but I am afraid I am deſcribing *Rara avis in terris*) A Man that will loſe his Place, or Fortune, or Favour rather then not plainly, and without Artifice tell his Maſter betwixt them two, what is his Opinion; afterwards though his Maſter's Judgment be like to be his Maſter's prejudice (becauſe Councellors are not Preceptors) that will induſtriouſly obey his Maſter's Commands, as he wou'd have done, if his Maſter's Commands had been grounded upon his own Council; for he ought to think, that his Maſter's Opinion or Inclinations may be better than his own. When the Prince cannot admit this Freedom, nor the Councellor (in caſe there be nothing immoral in it) make this Submiſſion, neither of them is fit for the other, If the Princes own Councels caſt what is ſettled into danger, or make it to be obtained by Extremities (though not Illegalities) upon his own Subjects, a good Man would rather make his retreat, and die obſcurely, than ſee his Maſter, or his Countrey run a great Riſque: For it was *Caliſthenes* his great Honour, not that he is ſaid never to have betrayed his Prince unto others, but becauſe he would never condeſcend to betray him to himſelf, as moſt Flatterers do, or concur with him when his Opinion differed. Thus it is one thing to obey a Prince, another to councel him.

This

This imaginary Sincerity (for we may rather deſcribe it, than hope to meet with it) in a Prince's Councellors will incline him that thus values ſimplicity of Mind, to avoid all ſubtil and underhand Ways; for a Man of this Temper is a judging or thinking Perſon, and he knows human Actions are beſt managed by familiar and eaſy means; for the plain-hearted Man, who reſolves ſingly to have his Eye upon the Nature of the Buſineſs he is to act in, (and he cannot well underſtand the Nature of an Affair, if he totally forget the Conjuncture of the times, and Perſons engag'd about it) he will diſcard Subtilty, and not ſuper-refine upon that which may end well, if he make not new Adventures, that might *conclude better:* Since as *Cardinal Mazarine* obſerved the *Faiſons mieux* ſpoiled more Buſineſs, than ever it advanced, for Subtilty commonly ſows Thorns, and often is forced to walk over them; *Machiavill's Borgia* thus prickt his own Feet, and ſo did *Pope Clement* the VIIth, and *D'Avila* obſerves, *Henry* the IIId, grew weary of the Intrigues his Secretary *Villeroy* had intangled him in, and *Bentivoglio* ſhews *Cardinal Granvill's* dexterities proved *Philip* the IId's Intanglements. A Prince or Councellor therefore muſt not conſider the Advantages, the end he propoſes will get him, and forget that the Complexion of the times, and the Humours of Subjects may be indomitable, or ſuperable with ſo much hazard, that it will be no Wiſdom, to put a Prince's Fortune upon the chance of a Dye. A Prince's greatneſs ſhould riſe, like a Vegetable, indiſcernably, for haſtning to be rich, and to be great, or abſolute, are both dangerous.

No

No Man will be long thus ſincere, or honeſt, who hath not Courage; for it is an Act of bravery, to ſeek his Maſter's Advantage before his own, for Courage frees him from the Sollicitude of diving into his Maſters Inclinations, or ſcrutining *abditos Senſus Principis*, or being concern'd what Party ſtands in oppoſition to him, or what harm they can do him, which Thoughts take up the whole time of a timerous Councellor who proſtitutes both his Maſters, and his own Honour for a little Security. This Temper is ever reclaiming Rebellions by Careſſes or Expedients, and ſpends moſt of their Advice in ſhoving up the Houſe they plainly ſee will fall, but hope it will laſt their time. Their Trade is how to obſerve which party in a Court prevail, and to be officious towards it, and they care not in what languiſhing Condition their Maſters Affairs are, ſo their own Poſt be ſafe; with the *Amſterdam Dog* they will at beſt defend their Shoulder of Mutton for a time, but when they ſee the other Dogs have pull'd it out of the Basket, they will go in for their Share. It was faintneſs in Council loſt both *Rome* and *Conſtantinople*, and, I may ſay, *England*, or the Monarchy in King *Charles* the Firſt's time. His Army's Diſcipline rendred them not formidable to the Rebels, and yet the Counſellors were afraid of their too great Proſperity.

A good Councellor ſhould be ſteady in his Advice, but ſteadineſs differs much from Inflexibility. He that adheres to Principles is reckned ſteady; yet, when the conjuncture of Affairs requires it, he muſt ſtrike Sail, and he can own it; for, ſays *Cicero*, as Affairs ſubmit themſelves often to me, ſo muſt I ſometimes unto them; *Ut mihi Res ſic me rebus ſubmittere cogor.*

And

And *Cato*, had he been leſs poſitive, had preſerved *Rome*'s, or the Senate's Freedom longer. *Cato optime ſentit, ſed ſæpe Reipubl. nocebat.* Probity may be impetuous, and ſo conſequently nocent. Flexibility may ſuit with Judgment, becauſe forced by Neceſſity, but Inſtability can no way be juſtified, becauſe it is a natural inconſtancy of Mind, or weakneſs of Reaſoning.

A wiſe Councellor will not engroſs too many Affairs into his own Hands, nor encroach upon other Mens Offices, nor be apt to undervalue them in it, to raiſe his own Credit by the loſs of other Mens; for he that doth good Offices unto others, is in the beſt way to make hearty Friends for himſelf; and he muſt be patient to hear other Mens Advices, nay with ſome reſpectfulneſs bear their Follies: and he muſt be unconcerned when his own Councels are not complyed with, or are laid aſide. Above all, a Privy-Councellor ſhould be ſecret, for without ſecrecy neither Arms nor Council are like to be ſucceſsful. *Auguſtus* valued *Mæcenas* for his Secrecy, *Agrippa* for his laborious Patience, and *Virgil* for his pleaſurable and learned Converſation. If there be a Chink in a Council Chamber it diſcovers, or gives as much light as a Window doth in another Room. Our great Chancellor *Bacon* recommends it unto Princes, to beware that they themſelves unſecret not their own Affairs; for crafty Men will lay trains by Diſcourſes of one kind, to find the ſecret Reſolutions of another kind; ſo it is dangerous for Princes perſonally to treat with foreign Ambaſſadors, *&c.*

But leaſt this ſhould ſeem a *Platonick* Republick, or rather a Speculation than any thing that was probably practical, or might diſhearten Princes from looking after ſuch Men, to make Councellors

How much it is in the Power of a Prince to make good Counſellors for himſelf.

cellors of, we will only ſay, if Cuſtom and Habits can change Natures, Princes can do as much: for if the Prince will chiefly favour Men of good natural Endowments, and of a Moral Honeſty (which will ſoon turn into Piety) and if he encourage Induſtry, and let young Men perceive they muſt walk up unto Preferments by Stairs and Degrees, and beginning with the lower Offices before they can hopefully pretend unto the higheſt; if he find not good Men to ſerve him, he will make Men fit to ſerve him. So as it is much the Prince's own fault when he thinks a Favourite of Pleaſure or Sports, Converſation and Divertiſement, muſt preſently be fit to be made a Guide in buſineſs (for he can give the Place, but he hath not Omnipotency, to give the Abilities) or when he will look upon no Man himſelf but through a Glaſs, or as the Image of a Man is reflected unto him from a Favourite, or ſome great Officer, for this is to ſtrengthen their Root and weaken his own; for here, though the Guilt is his, the Obligation is anothers. This makes him have many Attendants, but few Servants; for Servants placed about him by great Men, are rather their Spies than his Servants: Such an unconcernedneſs as this, who is about him, makes him appear like a Town blockt up; he can freely receive no Proviſions he ſtands in need of; and his own Servants are diſheartned by perceiving great Mens Friends, or Servants every day preferred, or gratified before them. This courſe chills all publick ſpiritedneſs; for Men introduced by Favourites, think they ſhall laſt no longer than their Patrons, who are often changed, or in the Wain; and ſo they come unto a Court like Harveſt-Men, who ſerve only in a ſhort time to reap that which others plough'd and harrow'd; or

or they work only in fair Weather, and when the Corn is carrying into the Barn. If a Prince therefore have ill Servants, he owes much of it unto his own negligence, or not valuing that which he ſtands moſt in need of.

And thus from his great Councellors or Miniſters of State, we will come to reflect upon his Menial Servants, and ſay ſomewhat of his little Family or Court, and then of his great Family or Common-weal, or the ſeveral Orders of Men in the Common-weal, each of them being to be a part of his Regal ſtudy, for by them he may be ſerved, or he may be indangered; and neither Servant nor Subject will be long uſeful, when he obſerves there is no obſervation of what he doth: And nothing may ſhew a Prince more his declenſion, than when both theſe ſorts of Men are unconcern'd, whether he be pleaſed or diſpleaſed with their Service. And very often the Irreverence that is paid him in his own Court, is the Mother of the neglect of his Commands out of it: or that the Diſcontents of the one breed the Malevolence of the other. Yet it is a great Evidence, a Government is off of its Hinges when a few forward and daring Men openly oppoſe his Affairs, and many cautious ill-willers are pleaſed at it; and ſcarce any are ready to aſſert his Rights, or rather as *Tacitus* expreſſes it in his Terms, *Is habitus animorum fuit, ut peſſimum facinus auderent pauci, plures vellent, omnes paterentur:* When Mens Minds ſtood ſo affected, that few durſt attempt the utmoſt Crime, more were willing to have it done, all would have been contented had it been done.

A Prince's Menial Servants.

Libels and licentious Diſcourſes are ill Symptoms, and falſe News eaſily ſpread, and when Men in place ſpeak fearfully, and thoſe that in-

vade Government boldly, it is a ſign Reverence is loſt. *Tacitus* expreſſes it, when they ſpeak, *Liberius quam ut Imperantium meminiſſent:* So freely that they ſeem'd not to remember they had Governours. Or, *Quando mallent mandata Imperantium interpretari, quam exequi*; When they had rather make Comments upon their Commands than obey them. Diſcontents among the Vulgar, and broken Eſtates among the great Ones, or if there be other combuſtible matter, no Man knows how ſmall a ſpark, or from whence it may come, that will ſet all on fire. When Fear is greater than Feeling, Jealouſies will admit of no Reaſoning: and when there is a general diſſolution of Manners, there is ſeldom found Authority enough to reclaim that People, but ſome notable Change follows; for there is in a State in ſome conjuncture of Time, as diſcernable a publick Madneſs as there is in private Men, and perchance I have lived to ſee it abroad or at home more than once.

A Prince's Court is a little Republick, and it is a great Sign that the Prince is in the Affection of his People, when his Servants are reſpected through his whole Kingdom, for the Reverence they bear him; which if it be pay'd by ſome few great Men of the Place where they come, it is ſoon imitated by all the reſt of the Country. Therefore his Servants, uſually called Courtiers, muſt be as courteous and civil in their Sphere, as they are willing to be kindly treated when they are in other Mens; ſo as a Prince's Family ought to be Perſons well choſen, and of good Reputation and Behaviour; and the nigher in Relation or Service the Perſon is unto the King, the more Humanity and Kindneſs he ſhould ſhew to thoſe who come to Court, eſpecially thoſe that come rather to pay

a Duty

a Duty than make a Suit; for this laſt ſort are to be anſwered friendly, but ſtill according unto the nature of the Requeſt. Acceſs ought to be eaſie, and anſwers made with gentleneſs as well as reaſonableneſs, for the Hand of Haughtineſs is not to reach even a Curteſy: for where the receiver is diſcontented in the manner of it, the Favour conferred is never half acknowledged.

A Prince ſhould not admit about his Perſon Men of bold Tempers, and who dare openly avow immoral Tenets or Principles; for theſe Men will ſoon call that which is Good, indifferent, and then they will not be long before, they will call that which is vicious, reaſonable; and artificially inſinuating into his Favour, by keeping intelligence with his Paſſions, they will endeavour to lead him from Vanity into Vice, and the fouler the latter is, if they be but an Inſtrument or Companion in it, the ſecurer they are in his Grace; for there is at a Court no ſuch ready way unto Gain and Preferment, as that which is got by ſome ſhameful Service; and ſuch Men being privy unto a Prince's clandeſtine Vices, they will never be quiet until they be admitted into his publick Concerns. Such trivial Servants, or ſmaller ſort of Favourites as theſe, have Politicks fitted to ſecure themſelves. There is nothing (ſay they) ſo ſafe for a Prince, as to make new Creatures of his own; a Prince muſt be conſtant, and adhere even unto his Errors, rather than be lightly carried over unto other Mens Judgments, leſt he ſeem to live upon a borrowed Reaſon. Hence it is, or from ſuch ſmall Favourites as theſe it is, that ſome Hiſtorians have obſerved, that when the Spring-heads of ſome Princes Counſels have been diſcovered, they are ſmall even unto Contempt. *Darius* his Expedition in-

to *Greece* aroſe either from a Phyſician unto himſelf, who told him what excellent Figs grew there, or from his Wife's Maid, who told her, *If the King made a War upon that Land, ſhe would have the great Ladies of* Greece *her Slaves. Varro* hath the like Obſervation, and Monſieur *de Pleſſis* aſſigns much of the Miſeries that befel the *French* Nation upon the Catholick League, unto the Duke of *Guiſe*'s cheating of Monſieur *d'Eſpernon* of a Miſs. And thus often a Favourite's Paſſion begins a War, as well as a Prince's publick Intereſt. On the lower ſort of ſmaller Favourites *Boccalini* puts a high Contempt, when he ſays, *All the Money in a Prince's Treaſure will not buy Sugar enough to candie, or ſweeten them.* The Abbot *d' Eſcally* I remember long ſince at *Bruſſels* told me a very pleaſant Story, how his wiſe Maſter the Duke of *Savoy (le Viel Renard des Mountaines)* took from him an elegant Barber that he had, who grew ſo great a Favourite, that he truſted him in ſome of his important Services, in which miſcarrying he complain'd unto the Abbot; *Sir* (ſays the Abbot) *concern not me herein, for I put him unto the outſide of your Head, you put him into the inſide.* A Prince therefore muſt be very careful in the choice of his Servants, that they be Men equal unto their buſineſs, and not above it, or under it, honeſt minded, as well as ſtrong brain'd; for to ſerve faithfully is as neceſſary, as to ſerve ably, ſince Abilities ſeldom make recompences for frauds, and ſince honeſt Men in Favour will ſeldom want the Parts of able Men not yet admitted thereunto. *Balzac* ſays truly, *the Greatneſs of a Prince muſt not rob him of the pleaſanteſt part of human Paſſion, ſcil.* the free and kind Converſation of ſome Perſon, whom by ſome ſecret and unaccountable motion

A Favourite of pleaſure allowable, but not to be made a Favourite of buſineſs.

motion he likes in Converſation; for neither moral Vertue nor Policy puts any ſuch Reſtraint upon Nature, theſe correct the imperfections of ſenſual Appetites, but gratifie both great and ſmall Inclinations in natural and not immoral Contentments. But publick Miniſters, or ſuch as are privately employed about publick Affairs, are to be choſen by Reaſon, not Affection. Such choices as hath been already obſerved *Auguſtus* made, when he drew into his Affection and Service, both *Mecænas*, *Horace*, and *Virgil*, who were qualified as well to be Councellors as Companions. Beſides, an ill Favourite is often a neceſſary Inſtrument or Skreen unto a worſe Prince; for *Tacitus* obſerves, *Tiberius* was worſe without *Sejanus* than with him: and People wreak their ill-will rather upon theſe, than on their Prince.

Nothing is meant more here, than that a Favourite of Pleaſure ſhould not be a Favourite of Buſineſs. A Prince ſhould be the Maſter of the Spring-head himſelf, that he may water when he pleaſes; for if he ſuffer himſelf to be ingroſſed, and paſſes his Influences by another unto all his Dependents, he may have outward Reverence, but never inward Eſteem; for ſuch uncontroulable Favourites for the moſt part, as they are very expenſive in themſelves, ſo they are very inſolent unto others: and therefore upright and able Men will not ſerve under them. Thus they are like Beacons or Light-Houſes at Sea, which old Sailors know are to be avoided, and young make towards them in the Night, and endanger a Shipwrack.

A Prince's great Family, or Orders of Men in his Nation.

Theſe, and many more troubleſome Conſiderations a Prince hath about his Domeſticks or little Family; many more than he muſt have about his great Family or Common weal; for as Individuals or ſingle Men are to be conſidered, ſo every Rank

Rank or Profeſſion of Men are to be weighed by him, ſince his Security or his Danger hath in ſeveral Periods of Times ariſen, as his Nobility or Commons, nay as his Clergy have been affected and predominant. Nay he is to obſerve even the natural and conſtant Clime of his Country, for that will learn him much of the Temper of his Subjects in general; for, as *Barclay* ſays, *Hæret quædam vis inconcuſſè hominibus pro conditione Terrarum.* And ſome Ages run unto Arms, others unto Learning, ſome unto Trade, ſome unto Superſtition in their Religion or Phanaticiſm; with all theſe difficulties his Spirit of Government muſt grapple, and without a Spirit of Government he will miſcarry, or if he pleaſe not himſelf in the Affairs of his Government, or if it be his Task, not part of his pleaſure. A Prince's Politicks will be as improſperous as his Oeconomicks are, who loves to ſpend freely, and yet never to look upon an Account.

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